During the autumn session of the UN General Assembly in New York, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with the leader of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. They discussed deeper business cooperation and the joint efforts of Ukraine, the United States, Europe and other partners to end the war. Step by step, Kazakhstan has been distancing itself from Russia through cautious actions and statements.
Ukraine and Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan continues to support Ukraine’s sovereignty. Most recently it was reaffirmed it just a month ago. The country has supplied humanitarian aid to Ukraine, including medicines and generators, which were delivered via the Embassy of Ukraine in Kazakhstan. According to a 2025 DEMOSCOPE survey, one-fifth of Kazakhstanis (20%) expressed support for Ukraine, while 15%, among which are mostly respondents over 60, sided with Russia.
Ukrainian exports to Kazakhstan reached US $291.48 million in 2024, marking the first increase since the start of the full-scale invasion. Both countries have significant potential to expand cooperation in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, technology and the humanitarian sphere.
Moving beyond the post-Soviet paradigm
States in Central Eurasia and South Caucasus are gradually reducing Russian influence. In 2023 Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev criticized proposals for reintegration with Russia, stating that political integration with Moscow is not desirable. Kazakhstan’s abundant natural resources make it a focus of both Western and Chinese interest: in summer 2025 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Astana to strengthen China’s position, and two months earlier Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni also paid an official visit.
It is also worth recalling the recent Russian–Azerbaijani crisis, when Moscow’s pressure on Azerbaijan prompted a wave of nationally driven decisions in the region. President Ilham Aliyev even urged Ukraine “not to agree to occupation”.
In the energy sphere, Tokayev stressed his readiness to use alternative routes, including the Baku–Ceyhan oil pipeline. At the end of June, Kazakhstan and Turkey considered increasing exports of Kazakh oil through this path, bypassing Russia.
Armenia, too, has become more assertive. In March 2025 the Armenian parliament passed a law launching the country’s integration into the European Union; in August Yerevan and Beijing announced a strategic partnership. Following a symbolic peace deal with Azerbaijan in Washington, Yerevan has been re-evaluating its place between West and Asia more confidently.
Conclusion
The gradual erosion of Russian dominance is opening opportunities for countries once labelled “post-Soviet”. By diversifying energy routes and building closer ties with Europe, the United States, China and other partners, these states can expand trade, attract investment and strengthen their sovereignty. While most still tread carefully, the shift toward alternative energy and multi-vector diplomacy is already reshaping the region’s political and economic landscape. This is a new issue in the framework of West-East confrontation for stronger partnership with middle countries. However, for Ukraine, weakening of Russian Economy is always beneficial.
