Wien
A cold wind blew through the Nordic region, when Russia recently expressed its displeasure over the Baltic Sea borders and confiscated several buoys on the Narva, the politically sensitive border river between Estonia and Russia. No one in the West saw an immediate threat. For that, the Russian troops are too busy in Ukraine. But many were reminded of the mix of psychological and hybrid warfare that the Kremlin used before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia is trying to intimidate the public and the politicians around the Baltic Sea and Europa at large prior to the EU-elections this week. The Kremlin will go to any lengths to prevent Ukrainians from attacking targets in Russia itself with Western-supplied weapons. The decision by the West to provide the Kyiv government with this capability has not yet been made, but it is coming. Almost all NATO countries understand that the Ukrainians have the military, legal and moral right to attack positions both in Russia and in the Russian-occupied part of Ukraine, from where their cities are bombed around the clock.
The Kremlin is indirectly stating that if the war in Ukraine does not soon reach the end that Vladimir Putin demands, i.e., the death of Ukraine as a sovereign and democratic European republic, he could expand the conflict in the direction of the Baltic Sea and the North. There are even hints of a nuclear war. Western experts interpret this verbal warmongering as a sign of weakness. Russia threatens and threatens, but it does not have the power to carry out its threats and is being held back by China, which does not want a major conflict with NATO or a number of NATO countries. The Kremlin is clearly disturbed by the prospect of one more defeat in the so called near abroad, shortly before the NATO summit in Washington. Russia must show strength now, exactly because Russia is weak in the long term.
The West supports Ukraine as a future member of NATO and the EU, and is pleased to see that the military assistance, delivered over the last few weeks, is beginning to work. The Ukrainians have stopped the Russian advance in the direction of Kharkiv and are fighting well in other sectors. Few people fear that Russia might break Ukraine. If it does, the Ukrainians, backed by Poles, Balts and others, can launch an indefinite guerrilla war, draining an already depleted Russia, much like the defeat of the French colonial power in Algeria 60 years ago.
The Kremlin’s provocations in and near the Baltic Sea did not impress the countries of Northern Europe. They have long been aware of the presence of the war in the shape of the Kaliningrad enclave and the vulnerable Suwalki corridor connecting Poland to the Baltic states. The strategic thinking runs like this: the Ukrainians can hold the existing front line, more or less, until the summer of 2025. Then, with the unconditional help of the West – including fighter jets and long-range precision missiles targeting military installations in Russia and in the territories occupied by Russia – Ukraine will be able to turn the tide of the war and inflict such heavy human, material, and economic losses on Putin that he will be forced to surrender before the end of the centenary.
The Kremlin still hopes to force Ukraine to cede one or two territories, such as Crimea and the Donbas, which can be sold to the Russians as a historic victory and the end of the war. The West has no intention of contributing to this. On the contrary, a growing number of NATO member states are thinking of stepping up the military assistance to Ukraine, of freeing Ukraine from the present illogical constraints on the use of these weapons, and of closing Ukrainian airspace to protect the republic’s severely wounded cities. These considerations include the F-16 fighter jets supplied by Denmark, which are expected to take to the air within the next six months.
A sober look at the overall geopolitical situation shows that Russia is in a worse position than ever. Until recently, Moscow’s sphere of influence extended far into the Baltic, to the Black Sea and to Central Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, virtually all of these possessions have moved on to NATO and the EU. Gone is the dream of an Asian-European empire from The Pacific to the Atlantic, dreamt by various rulers from Peter the Great to Stalin the Killer.
Despair and chaos seem to accompany the unwinnable war in Ukraine. The armed forces have already lost about half a million men and a huge amount of equipment, and the Russian economy is on steroids. Last year’s mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin and the recent massacre in Krasnogorsk near Moscow are indicative of the decline of state power. Dozens of generals and other senior officers have disappeared in recent months. Among the missing is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, reportedly one of Putin’s few personal friends. Shoigu’s successor is an unconvincing civilian economist, Andrei Belousov. He will have a tough time in a ministry, known for its impenetrable chain of command, its intrigues, corruption, and incompetence.
Russia is sharpening its rhetoric and its challenges, but losing the war.
By Per Nyholm
*These opinions are solely those of the author. The Ukrainian Review takes no position and is not responsible for the author’s words.
Per Nyholm has been a Danish journalist since 1960. He is based in Austria and is a columnist and foreign correspondent at the Jyllands-Posten, a liberal Danish daily newspaper.
Tetiana Stelmakh adapted this text for The Ukrainian Review.
