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The Ukrainian Review

ISSUE N° 5



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ON THE PRECONDITIONS OF UKRAINIAN RESILIENCE

Russia's millennial war against Ukraine is a civilizational war between two worlds - the European world (the world of order and law) and the Moscow world (the darkness of despotism and lawlessness). And the Kremlin's goal in this war, which Putin does not hide, is to destroy the Ukrainian state, to wipe the Ukrainian nation off the face of the earth.



THE WAR IS NOT OVER YET

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, many around the world didn't believe our country would last even a few weeks. On various international platforms — including informal conversations with some world leaders — there were not only words of support but also expressions of irreversible sympathy.



UKRAINE IS NOT "ONE OF THE TOPICS" BUT A CENTRAL PRIORITY, — BORYS TARASYUK

The establishment of a Special Tribunal for Russia, the return of abducted Ukrainian children, the Compensation Mechanism and restoration are the main priorities of Ukrainians in the Council of Europe. We talked to Borys Tarasyuk about his activities as Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe and our plans for the rest of the year.

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DEAR READERS!

This is a new issue of our magazine, which we are dedicating to one of the most important topics of modern Ukraine – resilience of the people.

Ukrainian resilience is not just a character trait, but the foundation of our modern statehood. It manifests itself in society's ability to withstand external pressure, maintain unity in times of trial, and at the same time build a new, strong, just, and democratic future. For centuries, we have fought for our right to exist, and we continue to do so today.

This magazine is dedicated to analyzing the challenges and opportunities facing Ukraine, as well as the stories of the people, institutions, and decisions that shape our path. After all, politics is not just about laws and strategies, but also about the daily struggle for freedom, dignity, and development.

We believe that Ukrainian resilience is not only our shield, but also our genetic code.

TETIANA STELMAKH
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF



VOLODYMYR SAVCHENKO, THE FOUNDER AND IDEOLOGICAL INSPIRER OF THE PROJECT

This issue has been prepared to mark the anniversary of Ukraine's Independence Day. With each passing year, we become ever more convinced that our country is growing stronger, freer, and more confident about its future. The difficult trials that Ukraine has endured have only hardened us and made us more united.

In this edition, we sought to tell the world more about Ukraine — in all its dimensions. Here you will find materials about the lives of our soldiers, the state and prospects of the Ukrainian economy, insights from politicians and distinguished experts, as well as the views of our international partners who believe, together with us, in victory and recovery.

Later this autumn, we will present the next issue, where we will continue to share the story of Ukraine's path to victory and its future in the European family.

Hope you enjoy this issue!



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REGISTRATION CODE FOR INDIVIDUAL MEDIA:

R40-01344

EDRPOU: 45222798

ADDRESS:

1A HRETSKA STREET, ODESA, 65014, UKRAINE

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MAGAZINE CIRCULATION:

10,000 COPIES

FOUNDED IN 2022

INDEPENDENCE IS NOT A GIFT. SUSTAINABILITY IS NOT A CHOICE, BUT A WAY OF LIFE

On August 24, 2025, Ukraine celebrated 34 years of independence. But for Ukrainians, this is not just a date on the calendar – it is an annual reminder of who we are and why we stand.

We declared independence in 1991. But the real test came in 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale war. Since then, every day has been a struggle to preserve not only our land, but also the values that unite the free world: freedom, dignity, and democracy. We are still fighting for the right to live freely and to choose our own future.

WE HAVE DEDICATED THIS ISSUE TO RESILIENCE. WHAT IS RESILIENCE FOR A UKRAINIAN?

- It means holding the front under fire.
- It means teaching children in bomb shelters.
- It means opening businesses without electricity.
- It means never giving up.

This is not a slogan. It is our way of life.

We stood when everything seemed to be lost. We are holding on when missiles, propaganda and fear are used against us. We did not break – because the resilience of Ukrainians has become a new definition of modern democracy in action.

AND YOU, OUR INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, ARE ALSO AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR HISTORY

Ukrainians know that they are not alone. The support we receive from you – weapons, equipment, finance, diplomacy, but also sincere human gestures – has helped us to survive. And we are sincerely grateful to every nation, every government, every heart that stood with us in our darkest days.

But we ask you to stay with us. Because this is not just about Ukraine. We are fighting for a world in which the aggressor has no right to rewrite borders. We are fighting for the principle that force is not a right.

Thank you very much. Stay with us. Our fight is yours too.



IHOR SOLOVEI — HEAD OF THE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SECURITY



AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL VOTE ON THE ACT OF INDEPENDENCE —
VERKHOVNA RADA, 1991

"PEACE" TALKS IN THE US

This article was written as of August 23, 2025.

Trump looked exhausted and irritated after meeting with Putin in Alaska. He also said that he would consider renewing threats of immediate sanctions against Russia only if the trilateral talks did not bring progress towards peace. The symbolic gesture was the cancellation of the traditional lunch and communication with journalists. Trump was clearly dissatisfied because he could not achieve a quick ceasefire, at least in the air.

After that, various media outlets began to show official photos of the preparations for the summit in Anchorage, it becomes clear that everything did not go according to plan, although Trump is trying to convince us otherwise until the last moment. Ukrainian journalists and military write that the US President has nevertheless taken the side of Russia, he is ready to abandon the ceasefire in favor of a comprehensive agreement on a complete end to the war.



Trump meets the Russian dictator putin in Alaska.

As we have heard repeatedly, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy refused to give up Donbas during negotiations with Trump and European leaders. At the same time, European leaders and Trump discussed possible "Article 5" security guarantees for Ukraine outside of NATO as part of a potential peace deal.

European leaders have rightly fully sided with Ukraine on this issue and have vowed to continue supporting Ukraine. There should be no restrictions on Ukraine's armed forces or its cooperation with third countries. Moscow cannot have a veto on Ukraine's accession process to the EU or NATO. EU and British leaders have ruled out any restrictions on arms supplies to

The Russian dictator wants Kyiv to completely withdraw its troops from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, while Russia will freeze the front lines in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. One thing can be said: this will not happen. In the Donbas, over the 11 years of war, Ukraine has built the strongest fortifications in Europe, which the Russian horde has never been able to overcome. Giving up this "wall" means opening a direct path for the occupiers in the future to Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Central Ukraine. Any Ukrainian government that signs this will make itself a political suicide in the eyes of the Ukrainian people.

The point about the official status of the Russian language in some parts of Ukraine or throughout Ukraine, as well as the right of the Russian Orthodox Church to operate freely will be a real blow to Ukraine's current European path...

The visit of the European leaders and Zelenskyy went surprisingly positively in the Oval Office, without any disputes like last time. JD Vance: I told Zelenskyy: "As long as you behave well, I won't say anything." He laughed, and that was a good impetus to solving the problem.



From global trends and actions, it follows that all sides are simply trying to politically outlive Trump. Russia is not interested in any negotiations, they are simply playing along with the US President and doing everything possible to appease him.

Europe needs another 1.5-2 years to rearm, and Ukraine plays a key role here, because it is a barrier and buys time for our partners at the cost of the best representatives of its population...



Group photo of European leaders, President Trump, and President Zelensky during a meeting in New York

Next year, elections to the U.S. Congress will take place. Everything will depend on the foreign policy track and on how effectively Trump can address domestic issues within the country. For him, this will be a serious challenge, and he may try to withdraw from the war by stating that he has done everything possible, but that “the Ukrainians/Russians do not want peace.” It will be important for him to shift the focus to internal matters.

And what will happen next with the war? It will continue. And yet, everything is not so good in the Russian economy. Will it last long? 1.5-2 years of war are still for sure. The West is encircling Russia, preparing the Baltics, the Black Sea region, Central Asia in order to set fire to Russia, but for this we still need to prepare. And unfortunately, Ukraine is that trap with a victim that holds the muzzle of the beast.

There have already been many options for cities to hold the Putin-Zelensky summit, from Rome and Geneva to Istanbul and even Moscow. Some analysts write about China as a potential meeting place, but the 25th solemn SCO summit will soon be held, and XI would not want Ukraine and Russia to overshadow all preparations and meetings with various leaders, even in his worst nightmare. And Trump will not allow the title of peacemaker to be taken away from him and given to the main enemy, China.



Meeting and discussions at the White House.



CONCLUSION

A meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy can only take place after the Trump administration exerts pressure on Russia to make concessions in the negotiation process. If such a meeting does happen, it will be a victory for Ukraine, since Putin will no longer be able to claim the “illegitimacy” of the Ukrainian leadership or argue that Ukraine is an “artificial state.”

This war will last for many years. Even in the event of a “frozen” conflict, we will face a situation similar to the divided Koreas: constant tension and no final resolution. Russia, in any case, will return to aggression in a few years, because its current ideology is built on the destruction of the so-called “existential threat” embodied by Ukraine. Only after a generational change in Russia’s political leadership, if they recognize their mistakes, might there be, perhaps years from now, a chance for some kind of constructive dialogue between the two countries.

According to recent surveys, 74% of Ukrainians believe that victory in this war means the end of massive missile attacks, the return of all captured children, the return of all prisoners of war, and the complete cessation of the war. People are tired of the war; they want to live normal lives. At the same time, Ukraine needs clear and reliable security guarantees that will prevent a new war in the future. We do not need another Budapest Memorandum.

The optimal option for ending this war at the current stage is freezing hostilities along the existing front line, provided that Ukraine receives clear and guaranteed mechanisms of security.

TEAM OF THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW



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PRESIDENT TRUMP AND PRESIDENT ZELENSKY ARE HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH A MAP OF UKRAINE IN THE BACKGROUND.

ON THE PRECONDITIONS OF UKRAINIAN RESILIENCE

Russia's millennial war against Ukraine is a civilizational war between two worlds - the European world (the world of order and law) and the Moscow world (the darkness of despotism and lawlessness). And the Kremlin's goal in this war, which Putin does not hide, is to destroy the Ukrainian state, to wipe the Ukrainian nation off the face of the earth.

For a thousand years – starting with Kievan Rus – our ancestors have shown courage and resilience. And then, under the yoke of various empires, they preserved national memory, culture, and language. And repeatedly rebelled against the occupiers. We, modern Ukrainians, know and remember this - this is the main source of our national resilience and the key to our victory. And the Russian Empire will certainly fall.

The feat and legacy of our ancestors is the first prerequisite for Ukrainian resilience.



*Head of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine
Kyrylo Budanov and “Titan,” commander of
the “Artan” unit.*

Having conquered Ukraine, Moscow appropriated not only its natural resources, but also its history and culture. The Russian Empire cannot exist without Ukraine, it is facing inevitable stagnation and disintegration. Therefore, when Ukraine became independent in 1991, it was only a matter of time before a new Russian-Ukrainian war broke out.



**KYRYLO BUDANOV, GENERAL HEAD OF
UKRAINIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**

When Russia launched a full-scale military invasion on January 24, 2022, attacking Ukrainian cities with missiles and aircraft, the Ukrainian Defense Forces responded decisively. In particular, the GUR's fighters in Hostomel defeated an elite Russian landing force, preventing the enemy from capturing Kyiv by surprise.

The whole country, without exaggeration, rose to fight the invaders. Ukrainians showed amazing cohesion and unity. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers joined the army, and everyone else supported the front with whatever they could. The volunteer movement in Ukraine has reached unprecedented proportions. The enemy can defeat the army, but no one has ever managed to defeat the entire nation.

The unity of the entire Ukrainian nation – government and people, army and home front – is the second prerequisite for Ukraine's resilience.

Ukraine's war of defense against Russian aggression is defensive and just. Russia has challenged the entire civilized world. In their struggle, Ukrainians are not alone – all democratic states are with us: The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union and others. The moral, humanitarian, military and technical support of our allies is extremely valuable to us.

We are not alone, we are supported by the entire free world – this is the third prerequisite for Ukraine's resilience.

The latest Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression has been going on since February 2014, and a full-scale war has been going on for more than three and a half years. Ukrainians will fight as long as necessary, but today the question is: what will happen after our victory? What will Ukraine look like? What challenges will it face? Because on February 24, 2022, the world changed, the existing world order established after World War II was destroyed by Russia.

The key task facing the state and its institutions in the post-war period is to strengthen Ukraine's subjectivity. Regardless of the geopolitical shifts in the future world, the political logic of Ukraine's transformation is to join the European Union, NATO, and new security, political, economic, and regional alliances.

And no less important for Ukraine will be its internal transformation. We, the army and the home front, having gone through the crucible of this war, must take responsibility and modernize our country, make it even better, richer, freer and fairer, and a reliable partner for our Western allies. Ukraine is a country of opportunities!

KYRYLO BUDANOV



Three emblems: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — Official, Great, and Small.

DRONE AND TECHNOLOGY WARFARE: HOW UKRAINE IS CHANGING THE RULES OF WAR

Ukraine's defense forces have undergone a technological revolution, spurring domestic development of drones and other military tech. Before the invasion, Ukraine had only around 30 domestic drone manufacturers; now there are close to 200. This explosive growth is fueled by urgent battlefield needs and streamlined bureaucracy. The range of UAVs in use spans from low-cost first-person-view (FPV) quadcopters to long-range combat drones. Small commercial drones like DJI Mavics and Matrice models have been adapted for frontline reconnaissance and bombing, while larger indigenous UAVs (and even Turkish Bayraktar TB2s) carry out deep strikes.

Every drone produced in Ukraine has its use... even if it is used by the smallest unit – we purchase it, – says Yuri Shchyhol, head of the State Special Communications Service, describing how the government's Army of Drones program eagerly absorbs local innovations.

This program, initially a volunteer initiative, became a full-fledged state project that in one year procured 5,000 drones worth about \$4.5 billion (approximately \$122 million). Notably, **80%** of the drones purchased by the program are made in Ukraine, battle-tested and customized for war conditions.

Ukrainian companies and startups are at the forefront of UAV production for both reconnaissance and strike missions. They produce everything from tiny FPV kamikaze drones costing a few hundred dollars to heavy octocopters and mid-range fixed-wing drones. Many off-the-shelf civilian drones have been ingeniously repurposed for combat. Soldiers routinely modify hobbyist quadcopters to drop grenades or serve as eyes-in-the-sky for artillery. This has led to what one report calls a “revolutionary breakthrough” in the use of drones as weapons – never before and nowhere else has there been such demand for them. The Ukrainian army is estimated to be losing around 10,000 drones per month on the front, yet still needs far more; volunteer experts suggest demand is 20 times higher than current supply. Such losses are quickly compensated by local mass production and inventive workarounds, ensuring that Ukrainian units are rarely left blind.



A Ukrainian soldier of the 71st Jaeger Brigade prepares a FPV drone, Donetsk region, March 2024.

Beyond drones, Ukraine's military is integrating advanced armor and electronics and even experimenting with robotics and artificial intelligence. Western-provided tanks and armored vehicles have been upgraded with new reactive armor panels and electronic countermeasures to survive on a sensor-saturated battlefield. Ukrainian developers are building automated turret systems and unmanned ground vehicles for dangerous tasks. For example, the army has begun deploying remote-controlled machine gun turrets that soldiers operate from a safe distance – even using game controllers in some cases. This repurposing of consumer technology underlines how **innovation thrives under pressure**.

Artificial intelligence is another force multiplier. The Ukrainian military has developed software platforms to analyze battlefield data and assist decision-making. Enormous troves of combat footage – an estimated **2 million hours** of drone video – are being used to train AI models for target recognition and battle management.

This is food for the AI: If you want to teach an AI, you give it 2 million hours of video, it will become something supernatural, – explains Oleksandr Dmitriev, founder of a system that centralizes live feeds from over 15,000 drones.



Ukraine has also leveraged extensive cooperation with foreign partners to modernize its forces. Western weapons like HIMARS rockets, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and air defense systems have been integrated into Ukraine's own command networks, often enhanced by local software tweaks. Joint ventures have been launched with U.S. and European companies to produce artillery shells and even anti-aircraft missiles on Ukrainian soil. This blend of domestic ingenuity and imported technology is exemplified by projects such as the "people's satellite" – a SAR imaging satellite bought via a Ukrainian crowdfunding campaign. Using donations, a Ukrainian charity obtained access to a Finnish ICEYE radar satellite, giving Kyiv real-time eyes in the sky.

FPV DRONES, SATELLITE COMMUNICATION, CYBER WARFARE


One of the most game-changing innovations in this war has been the proliferation of FPV drones on the battlefield. First-person-view drones – nimble quadcopters piloted via headset – have become an inexpensive, effective, and mass-produced weapon for Ukraine. These small kamikaze UAVs, often assembled in workshops, carry explosive charges directly onto targets. Ukrainian units use FPV drones for everything from pinpointing enemy positions to destroying tanks and bunkers. Dozens of dedicated FPV drone strike companies now operate on the front, and Ukraine even formed the world's first UAV strike units integrated at the battalion level. To counter Russia's armored vehicles, Ukrainian engineers have improvised drones like the "Vampire," which straps an anti-tank mine to a heavy FPV frame, essentially creating a guided hovering bomb.

Recognizing how crucial these systems are, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense aims to acquire 200,000 kamikaze drones by year's end – although current output is still catching up.

Secure communications are another area where technology turned the tide. At the start of the invasion, Elon Musk's Starlink satellite internet service was rapidly deployed in Ukraine, and it proved transformative. Starlink gave front-line units and commanders reliable broadband connectivity even when Russian strikes knocked out cellular towers or power grids. It enabled drone operators to stream live video feeds to targeting teams and allowed dispersed units to coordinate attacks in real time.



OLEKSANDR FEDIIENKO,
MEMBER OF THE
UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT





UKRAINIAN SOLDIER CARRYING A LARGE FPV DRONE
DURING A MISSION.

Oleksandr Fediienko, Member of the Ukrainian Parliament, highlights the importance of secure communications:

Modern warfare is fundamentally about automation, battlefield awareness, and the full digitalization of military operations. The Ukrainian military employs DZVIN for automation, DELTA for battlefield awareness, and VEZHA and OCHI for real-time intelligence transmission. These systems rely on high-bandwidth, low-latency connectivity to ensure rapid and effective decision-making on the tactical level, particularly for UAV strike units conducting reconnaissance near the front lines.

Mobile command centers with secure communication channels are essential for coordinating military units at both the operational and tactical levels. These centers integrate multiple communication technologies — not just Starlink but also fiber-optic networks and radio relay systems — to enhance resilience and redundancy. Starlink often dominates, but ensuring alternative communication pathways is critical to sustaining battlefield operations. For command-level coordination, bandwidth must exceed 100 Mbps to allow for uninterrupted video streaming from reconnaissance platforms and real-time intelligence analysis.

Of course, the digital war is not one-sided. Ukraine has had to bolster its own information security and critical systems against relentless Russian cyber onslaughts. Daily attempts to breach government networks, deface Ukrainian news sites, or disrupt energy distribution have largely been foiled.

Key to this success is a proactive cybersecurity strategy and international support. Companies like Microsoft and Cisco have aided Ukraine in monitoring threats and patching vulnerabilities, while the EU and U.S. have provided incident response expertise. The result is that Russia's much-feared "cyber warfare" has achieved limited impact on Ukraine's war effort. In a conflict filled with drones and precision weapons, a parallel invisible war of bytes and bits rages on – and Ukraine has so far managed to stay one step ahead through a combination of technical savvy, global partnerships, and the sheer will of its IT soldiers.

HOW VOLUNTEERS AND STARTUPS ARE SHAPING THE ARMY

Beyond drones, a myriad of Ukrainian startups are delivering novel military solutions. Companies specializing in artificial intelligence, encryption, robotics, and aerospace have redirected their products toward the war effort. Tech entrepreneurs who once built e-commerce apps are now developing apps for soldiers to request air support or map minefields. Small factories equipped with 3D-printers produce spare parts for Western weapons and even pieces of body armor.

One startup is launching clusters of microsatellites to improve reconnaissance. Another has made AI software that analyzes satellite imagery to predict enemy movements. Ukraine's famed IT sector – previously known for outsourcing and fintech – has largely refocused on defense tech. The result is an unprecedented blending of civilian innovation and military necessity.

Oleksandr Yavtushenko, Advisor to the Governor of Kyiv Region and Founder of Marius Consulting GR Agency for Miltech Startups, emphasizes the significance of this ecosystem:

Ukraine's technological revolution is fueled by a unique synergy between the military, startups, and volunteers. This combination is reshaping the future of warfare, proving that adaptability and innovation can outmatch brute force. Today, we have reliable partners with whom we have developed highly effective drones, ready for deployment across brigades and for export as soon as the conditions allow. Our ability to integrate cutting-edge technologies with real-time battlefield needs gives us an asymmetric advantage over the enemy, forcing them into a reactive position. This is not just about drones or AI; it is about a complete shift in how wars are fought and won in the 21st century.



KSENIIA KALMUS,
THE FOUNDER OF KLYN DRONES

FOOTAGE OF UKRAINIAN FPV DRONE
UNITS IN COMBAT OPERATIONS.



On the manufacturing side, some volunteers literally built arms factories in their garages. **Kseniia Kalmus**, for instance, was a florist before the war; today she runs a drone workshop in Kyiv that pumps out FPV drones for the front lines. Her story is emblematic of a broader phenomenon: teachers, artists, taxi drivers – people from all walks of life – have learned to build or operate drones, write code for the army, or train as aerial reconnaissance experts. This volunteer-technologist army works closely with Ukraine’s soldiers. Frontline units share feedback with drone makers about what designs work or fail, creating a fast innovation cycle. Civilians with no prior military experience have effectively become **weapons developers** and tactical analysts overnight.



We are now testing an FPV drone modification equipped with a double-barreled shotgun to hunt down enemy reconnaissance drones. Russian Mavic UAVs constantly attempt to locate our positions, but this innovation gives us a new way to counter them, – said Kseniia Kalmus.

The synergy of volunteers, startups, and the formal army has not only provided material aid but also shaped how Ukraine fights. Big data and AI from civilian experts help generals make informed decisions. Locally developed secure messaging platforms connect regular troops with volunteer drone pilots acting as forward observers. Even Ukraine’s information warfare – memes and social media campaigns – is largely driven by online volunteers. By democratizing the war effort, Ukraine has tapped into a wellspring of creativity and commitment that may have caught the Russian military off guard. This “whole-of-society” defense model is now a subject of study for military theorists. Future conflicts, observers note, may well be decided not just by professional armies, but by the nimble contributions of patriotic software engineers, drone hobbyists, and citizen hackers rallying to their nation’s cause.

OLEKSANDR YAVTUSHENKO



OLEKSANDR YAVTUSHENKO, THE GOVERNOR ADVISOR OF KYIV REGION AND THE FOUNDER OF MARIUS CONSULTING GR AGENCY FOR MILTECH STARTUPS



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CYBERWAR IS ALREADY UNDERWAY, AND UKRAINE IS AT THE FOREFRONT, – FS GROUP CEO SERHII YEVCHUK

WAR

We had a chance to talk in detail about this topic with Serhii Yevchuk, CEO of FS Group, an international company that provides comprehensive cybersecurity services to clients from Ukraine, the United States, Israel, and Europe. He has been working in the field of information security for more than 15 years, specializing in building cybersecurity systems, audits, incident investigations, and implementing innovative solutions.



What is Russia's place in today's global “hacker” war? Over the past decades, many countries have claimed cyberattacks from the Russians: Estonia, Poland, France, the United States, etc. These included interference in elections, government websites, hacking of databases, and so on. How serious are the challenges posed by Russia to the entire world? Do you think this is a targeted aggressive state policy in the field of cybersecurity? What is the purpose of Russia's cyberattacks?

Russia is one of the key players in the global hacker war. Over the past two decades, it has been systematically using cyberattacks as a tool of political pressure. We have seen examples of interference in the US elections, large-scale attacks on government websites in Estonia, Poland, and France. These are not chaotic actions – they are part of a state's aggressive cyber strategy aimed at destabilizing, weakening the enemy and spreading influence.

You represent FS Group, an international cybersecurity company that provides services not only to companies from Ukraine, but also from the US, Israel, etc. Based on your experience, what cybercrimes are currently posing the greatest threat to users and companies around the world and what technologies are most often used by cybercriminals for attacks?

The most common attacks are ransomware, when hackers encrypt data and demand a ransom. Also, many attacks are carried out through phishing and social engineering. APT groups (advanced persistent threats) are extremely cautious: they first conduct reconnaissance and then launch a targeted attack. Attackers also use AI to automate attacks, generate malicious code, or deepfake videos.



SERHII YEVCHUK, CEO OF FS GROUP



How big of a threat is the human factor in cybersecurity (for example, the attack on Kyivstar was carried out through the account of one of its employees)? Or are cyberattacks primarily about technology?

Most often, vulnerabilities lie not in the technology itself, but in people. The attack on Kyivstar is a good example: the attackers gained access to the system through an employee's account. But this is just one of the scenarios.

There are two main ways in which attackers gain access:

Through bribery or social engineering – when an employee grants access knowingly or accidentally.
Through credential compromise – when access to accounts is gained through malware (e.g., infostealers) or the use of so-called combo lists (large merged databases of logins and passwords from previous hacks).

Therefore, organizations need not only to train employees but also to constantly monitor accounts, detect their appearance in the darknet, and implement early warning systems for leaks. After all, compromised accounts often become the entry point for large-scale attacks such as ransomware, data encryption, sabotage, or espionage.

Ukraine is currently ranked 16th in the NCSI cybersecurity index, ahead of the UK and Ireland, for example. Can we say that we are well protected from cyberattacks and can become a leading partner in cybersecurity for Europe? If so, how can the Ukrainian experience of countering cyberattacks be useful for European countries?

Undoubtedly, we have a unique experience. Ukraine resists cyberattacks in real war conditions – not in laboratories, but on the battlefield. Our specialists are highly trained, and we are already partners for many Western companies and governments. Ukraine's experience is practical cyber defense in the face of maximum threat. A logical step for Ukraine would be to establish cooperation not only with Europe but also with NATO in the field of cybersecurity through joint training and experience exchange. These initiatives will be extremely useful for both Ukraine and European countries in general.

To what extent is Ukraine's cybersecurity legislation adapted to the requirements and norms of the European Union? In connection with the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 and the granting of the candidate status for accession to the European Union, is there any work being done to unify national and European legislation? What laws do we need to change and develop to achieve European standards?

We are moving in the right direction. We are already implementing regulations adapted to European directives, in particular NIS2. But we still need to update a number of regulations, in particular on incident management, certification of specialists, and liability for violations. This is necessary for integration into the European digital space.

YEVHEN DZHUMYGA



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IN TOTAL, ABOUT 2 MILLION HECTARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND REMAIN POTENTIALLY MINED

Ukraine lost about 20.5% of agricultural land due to the war. Returning land to cultivation is a complex process, according to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy. Mine clearance is the first step, but it is also necessary to restore soil fertility and conduct laboratory tests for heavy metals and other contaminants.

The state budget for 2025 allocates UAH 1 billion for the demining of agricultural land. The Ministry of Agrarian Policy continues to cooperate with international partners on the humanitarian demining process. In total, in 2025, we plan to inspect and clear explosive hazardous agricultural land on an area of 65094.48 hectares (for example, 77% of the area of Kyiv). As of the beginning of May 2025, 21.2 thousand hectares of agricultural land have been surveyed.

Of these, 10.2 thousand hectares have been demined, and the area in use is 11.6 thousand hectares.

According to the results of the survey and demining of agricultural land in 2023-2024, the area amounted to 598.1 thousand hectares and 412.7 thousand hectares, respectively. The area that is ready for use is 499.5 thousand hectares.

We asked, how much grain and other agricultural products has Russia exported over the three years of full-scale war and where does it sell these products and what actions should the Western community take to stop it or at least slow it down, given that Russia is constantly finding new ways to circumvent sanctions.

Ministry answered that at various levels and international platforms, we emphasize the need to block Russia's trade in stolen Ukrainian grain at the international level. Every year, Russia steals 5 million tons of grain from the occupied territories of Ukraine and, using technical means, passes this grain off as its own.

This grain is then shipped to the markets of the Middle East and Africa, and the proceeds are used to finance military operations on the territory of Ukraine. In 2024, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Lithuania signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a grain inspection scheme in Vilnius with the Minister of Agriculture of the Republic of Lithuania, Kazys Starkevičius.

It is a scheme for checking Ukrainian grain stolen by Russia from the occupied territories using a special GVS system. The goal is to prevent transshipment of this grain through Lithuanian ports. This trilateral document of understanding between the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and British parties was the first step to counteract the trade in stolen Ukrainian grain.



EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Ukraine is currently conducting simulation sessions, which are a direct preparation for the official EU screening. As part of this preparation, we have the opportunity to see and understand how the screening will take place in the sections for which the Ministry of Agrarian Policy is responsible. And also to prepare more thoroughly to ensure that the result of this screening is the best possible.

The next stage will be the screening itself, which is scheduled to take place within 3 weeks in September this year. Based on its results, a plan for further implementation of EU regulations will be developed. In fact, the screening is the beginning of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU. That is, based on its results, we will get a clear understanding of the next steps that Ukraine should take to further its European integration. We will also be able to conduct negotiations to ensure that this process takes into account the interests of the Ukrainian agricultural sector as much as possible, – said Vitaliy Koval, former Minister of Agrarian Policy.

In addition to the EU, Ukraine is working to enter new markets. The plan is to enter 31 new markets by 2025, in particular in Africa, the Middle East and China. What is needed to realize this goal?

- Promote the growth of containerized exports from Odesa ports, which will allow the use of refrigerated containers and thus enable the export of certain groups of goods, such as chicken eggs, to the East Asian markets.
- Ensure the opening of additional markets for Ukrainian agricultural products.
- To deepen cooperation in the agricultural sector with the countries of Central and Southern Africa, which should create preconditions for increasing markets for Ukrainian agricultural products in the countries of this region.

TETIANA STELMAKH



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A shell in the field.



Japanese demining equipment operating in Kharkiv region.



The demining of the ukrainian fields.

LOST GIGAWATTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY SYSTEM OVER 3 YEARS OF WAR

Since February 24, 2022, Ukraine has been fighting not only for its freedom against Russian invaders but also for the survival of its energy system.

Before the full-scale war, Ukraine was one of the largest electricity producers in Europe and had significant reserve capacity. In 2021, Ukraine increased electricity production by 5.2%, reaching 158.4 billion kWh.

Nuclear energy was the backbone of the energy system, producing 54.4% of all electricity. Before the war, Ukraine had four operating nuclear power plants: Zaporizhzhia NPP, South Ukraine NPP, Rivne NPP, and Khmelnytskyi NPP.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is the largest in Europe and, prior to the full-scale war, was a key facility in Ukraine's energy system, generating 40-42 billion kWh of electricity annually. This accounted for 50% of all nuclear generation and 20% of the country's total electricity production. Since March 4, 2022, it has been under Russian occupation.

Thermal power plants (TPPs) provided 23.5% of electricity. Ukraine had 15 TPPs, two of which were located in occupied territories.


During the full-scale war, all TPPs suffered destruction or severe damage, and their share in the energy mix dropped to about 5%.

Combined heat and power plants (CHPPs), of which there were 43 in Ukraine (10 located in temporarily occupied territories), supplied 6.4% of electricity. Due to Russian attacks, about 80% of CHPPs have been destroyed.

Renewable energy sources (solar, wind, and bio-power plants) accounted for 7.9% of total electricity production in 2021. Hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) generated 5.8%, pumped-storage power plants another 0.8%, and other sources 1.1%.

The most significant loss was the complete destruction of the Kakhovka HPP, along with damage to other major plants, including the Dnipro HPP.

Overall, in the three years of full-scale war, Russia has launched over 30 massive, coordinated attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. As a result, more than 60,000 energy facilities have been damaged, and 18 GW of generation capacity has been occupied.



ELECTRICITY FACILITIES WERE DAMAGED BY ONE OF THE RUSSIAN ATTACKS AS OF SPRING 2024

WAR



THE DEGREE OF DESTRUCTION:

-  COMPLETE
-  SIGNIFICANT TO COMPLETE
-  SIGNIFICANT
-  NOT YET KNOWN

PORTRAITS OF WAR: THE STORY OF AN ODESA COSSACK

In Odesa, Serhiy Hutsalyuk is known as a public figure, activist of the Cossack movement (ataman of the Black Sea Haidamak Association), and director of the Southern Branch of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. Nevertheless, Serhiy has been defending our homeland with arms for years.

Tell us, how did you decide to join the Armed Forces? When did it happen? What was your motivation?

My motivation was very strong. When the aggression began in 2014, I was just ashamed to sit at home with my wife when a lot of my friends, comrades, and acquaintances from the Maidan were already defending Ukraine. But I had problems with the fact that, first of all, I did not serve conscript service, my eyesight is poor. I went to the military registration and enlistment office and was sent to the Filatov Institute, where they gave me a conclusion. They said, "We can't take you with your eyesight.

I said, I want to, I want to volunteer. They started collecting certificates of no criminal record and everything else, but at that time a criminal case was opened against me for the Shufrych situation, you remember. It lasted almost until 2016. In 2016, it was all closed against me. And then I was able to join the Armed Forces.

At that time, I was assigned to the 59th Brigade. All this time, while this criminal proceeding was hanging over me, the guys and I were preparing for the Armed Forces as part of our Odesa self-defense. When I came there, to the 59th Brigade, I was already ready, in principle. This helped me a lot in my future service, the skills I acquired during this time.

You are a professional historian and have also been involved in a lot of social activities. To what extent did your professional skills help you at the front?

You know, everything helps. In addition to physical training, psychological, moral, this knowledge that you gained at university... Then the ability to find a common language with people, to communicate with large groups. This helped me a lot, of course. As soon as I got there, my then-commander told me that we needed a person who would be responsible for moral and psychological support, how do you see it?



Serhiy Hutsalyuk in civilian life.

I had just arrived, I was starting from scratch. I said, "Well, let me stay for a while, see what's going on. He said, yes, I agree. I started as a soldier, then I got a senior soldier, then a junior sergeant. I was already demobilized as a sergeant.

My military specialty was first a rifleman, then a machine gunner (PKM machine gun), then a squad leader, and I was already discharged as a senior combat medic, and I took courses. At the same time, I was dealing with these issues that the then-commander offered me when I first arrived. I was also actually acting as a deputy company commander for moral and psychological support at the time. Although none of me had the duties of a machine gunner at that time, or a squad leader, or anything else. Here in the army, there is a feature that you do a lot of things. Not necessarily those that your position requires.

By the way, this is an extremely important question. I know that you have had more than one, let's say, stressful situation. In particular, you were once contused. How do you deal with stress and emergencies psychologically at the front?

There is a whole methodology for doing this, but a lot depends on the team, a lot depends on your mood, your motivation. There are people who, no matter what happens to them, always remain optimistic. I try to do the same, because there is no other way. You always have to be positive, despite various difficulties. By the way, it was very difficult for me to get used to being a subordinate, because I have always been either a free man or a superior. In fact, during my first combat training, I was, as they say, advised and led by the hand by a guy who is my son's age. His name is Serhiy, too. I said, "Serhiy, you can scold me, curse me, but just tell me what to do. So he explained everything to me.

And then I started explaining it to people. By the way, my son is also in the Armed Forces, he is a captain in the Armed Forces. I am now a lieutenant. Basically, it so happened that I started my service very late in life. I was 43 years old at the time. And now I'm 53, I'm already a lieutenant. This is my career. Although I never had any aspirations or plans to build a military career. But this is how life happened.

How did you perceive the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine? To what extent was it expected for you?

I was demobilized in 2019, in the spring. I applied for the position of head of the newly created southern department of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. I passed the competition. And so we began our activities on decommunization, decolonization, and everything else, the results of which are still ongoing and this struggle continues. But this is another big topic.

After the full-scale invasion, I was in the Armed Forces from the first day. To be honest, I expected them to attack only in the East, in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. I didn't expect them to come from all sides. It came as a shock to me, to be honest. I didn't expect them to have so much strength. But then these timetables showed that they didn't have that much strength. From the first day, I have been in various units of the Armed Forces of the Operational Command "South". Now I am a lieutenant performing my duties as assigned. I cannot say more. It's after the war.

KOSTYANTYN GRECHANY



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**SERHIY HUTSALYUK, ACTIVIST AND
DIRECTOR OF THE SOUTHERN BRANCH OF
THE UKRAINIAN INSTITUTE OF
NATIONAL MEMORY**

THE ENEMY IS NOT GOING TO STOP: WE NEED WEAPONS

The situation at the front remains difficult due to constant enemy pressure along the entire front line. The most active areas remain Sumy region, the area of Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kostiantynivka, which covers its entire agglomeration, especially Chasiv Yar, Toretsk and the area of Yablunivka village, which is the third way for the enemy to move towards the city. Also, Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, Novopavlivka section.

In Sumy region, the situation has been stabilized, particularly on the left flank, but the Russians, having a fairly large number of resources in the region, continue to carry out active assault operations to advance or improve their tactical position. At the same time, having had no recent successes, the enemy began shelling Sumy with anti-aircraft gunships, artillery, and drones, destroying infrastructure and killing civilians.



In the Kharkiv region, the enemy is trying to expand the bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskil River, using a large number of infantry. Similarly, the Russians are trying to advance along the entire eastern section of the Kharkiv region, but are not having much success.

Recently, the Russians have focused a lot of attention on the city of Kostiantynivka, attracting additional resources to conduct assault operations and destroy the city. There are constant assaults in the direction of Kostyantynivka, and Russians are also dropping UAVs on the city and killing civilians with FPV drones.


The Pokrovsk area remains the most active, where the enemy has concentrated the largest number of forces and means. The enemy's principal goal is to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Dnipro regions in order to capture the entirety of Donetsk region and use the entrance to Dnipro region as an opportunity to conduct media propaganda and destabilize the situation. At the same time, the Russians have reached a distance where they have started hunting for logistics in the depths of the territory in the area of Dobropillia, which makes the situation much more difficult. They are doing this with the help of CABs and fiber-optic drones.

There is activation in the south, in particular in Zaporizhzhia region along the Kamianske-Orikhiv stretch, where the enemy has concentrated a large number of infantry and is trying to use the numerical advantage to improve its tactical position.

In conclusion, we can say that the enemy is not going to stop, having a numerical advantage in infantry and means to shell the rear positions and hunt for logistics. One of the components of the ability to stop the enemy is the supply of the necessary amount of weapons, which we desperately need from our Western partners.



ROMAN POHORILYI, CO-FOUNDER OF DEEPSTATE — AN INTERACTIVE ONLINE MAP BASED ON OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE TRACKING THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.



MAP OF COMBAT OPERATIONS ON THE DEEPSTATE WEBSITE

ALLIES IN ARMS: SECURITY SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE FROM PARTNERS

Ukraine's security partners' contributions have significantly influenced the course of the war. Supplies provided before the full-scale Russian invasion helped to halt the attack in 2022, while further decisions — such as delivering advanced artillery systems, air defence platforms, and long-range missiles — became turning points on the battlefield afterward. So far, Ukraine has signed 28 security agreements. Here are the key partners countries:

UNITED STATES

The United States remains a crucial partner in security cooperation with Ukraine, providing the largest amount of military, financial, and intelligence assistance. According to the U.S. Department of State, since 2014 the U.S. has provided approximately \$136.6 billion in aid, \$66.9 billion of which was allocated after the full-scale invasion.

Javelin anti-tank missiles were delivered before 2022 and played a key role in halting columns of Russian armoured vehicles. In the summer of 2022, the aid package included HIMARS systems capable of launching precision long-range missiles, which proved vital for preparing Ukraine's counteroffensive by targeting Russian ammunition depots.

In 2023, Ukraine began using ATACMS ballistic missiles with a range of up to 300 km. Another significant contribution is Abrams tanks, one of the most powerful armoured combat vehicles.

The delivery of Patriot air defence systems enhanced the protection of Ukrainian cities, allowing the interception of Russian ballistic missile attacks. Moreover, the U.S. initiated the Ramstein format, an international coalition coordinating military support for Ukraine. In Summer 2024, a Bilateral Security Agreement between Ukraine and the United States of America was signed.



UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS DURING A COMBAT MISSION ABOARD THE M2 BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE.

UNITED KINGDOM

According to the UK Government, the UK has committed £10.8 billion in military support for Ukraine. Shortly before the full-scale invasion, the United Kingdom supplied British-Swedish NLAW anti-tank weapons, designed for infantry use in difficult terrain. These weapons showed the effectiveness in destroying hundreds of Russian tanks during the first weeks of the big war. The UK was also among the first Western countries to transfer armoured vehicles to Ukraine. Challenger 2 tanks, which arrived in 2023 marked the first delivery of Western main battle tanks by allies. That same year, the UK provided Storm Shadow long-range missiles, capable of striking targets up to 250–300 km deep.

In addition, more than 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained in tactics, field medicine, and engineering in the UK through Operation Interflex. In 2024, the UK and Ukraine signed a Security Cooperation Agreement, which outlines long-term collaboration, including support for Ukraine’s adaptation to NATO standards.

GERMANY

According to the German government, military assistance to Ukraine under the Security Capacity Building Initiative amounted to approximately €1.6 billion in 2022, €5 billion in 2023, and around €7.1 billion in 2024.

IRIS-T air defence systems, supplied at the end of October 2022, when the enemy massively attacked Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, became one of the main components for Ukrainian air shield, and Ukraine became its world’s first operator. Another major step was the January 2023 decision to provide Leopard tanks known for their high manoeuvrability, accuracy, advanced fire control systems, and ergonomic design. Germany has also contributed to the sphere of drones, providing Ukraine with 619 reconnaissance drones VECTOR with spare parts and 1,050 strike drones HF-1.

Likewise, 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained in Germany. In 2024, Ukraine and Germany signed a bilateral security agreement, in which Germany pledged to support Ukraine in its self-defence efforts for as long as necessary.



A PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM — THE TYPE BEING SUPPLIED TO UKRAINE.

FRANCE

In the spring of 2025, France announced a new military aid package worth €2.1 billion. Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, France has provided Ukraine with €6 billion in defence support, in addition to approximately €1.6 billion allocated before February 2022. Paris has supplied Ukraine with strategically important modern weapons, including CAESAR howitzers, effective in the counter-battery fight, and SCALP-EG missiles – the French equivalent of the British Storm Shadow, with a range of 250 km, enabling Ukrainian forces to strike deep behind enemy lines, capable of destroying bridges and depots.

Beyond the delivery of military equipment, France contributes through training missions and co-finances defence assistance via the European Peace Facility. In 2024, France and Ukraine signed a bilateral security agreement under the G7 framework. At the beginning of 2025, Ukraine received Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from France, enhancing its air defence capabilities and providing additional support for ground operations.

CANADA

Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Canadian government has pledged over \$6.5 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. In response to the annexation of Crimea, Canada launched Operation UNIFIER, a military training mission that has trained over 44,000 members of the Security Forces of Ukraine.

At the beginning of the full-scale war, Canada provided M777 howitzers equipped with high-precision Excalibur ammunition, capable of reaching targets up to 40 kilometres away using GPS-guided technology. In 2024, amid growing demand for drone capabilities on the battlefield, Ottawa announced the delivery of more than 800 drones to Ukraine.

Canada is a key member of the Air Force Capability Coalition, leading the training of Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets. It has also contributed to Ukraine's air defence by donating AIM missiles and NASAMS in 2024. In February 2024, Canada and Ukraine signed a bilateral Security Cooperation Agreement valid for 10 years, underscoring long-term military and political support.

It is noteworthy that the Baltic and Scandinavian countries continue to invest the largest share of their GDP in support of Ukraine. Among the leaders in this regard are Estonia, Denmark, Lithuania, and Latvia. Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway have also provided Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine — a development that has enhanced Ukraine's capabilities in the air.

The assistance mentioned above is not exhaustive. Numerous other countries and alliances have provided military equipment and financial support, all of which contribute to Ukraine's resilience. Ukraine indeed feels the strength of international solidarity, which enables its defenders to operate more effectively on the frontline and helps to protect civilians from brutal attacks. The decisive rhetoric and actions of Ukrainian partners have supported the Ukrainian Armed Forces in both defensive operations and counteroffensives. A secure and well-equipped Ukraine serves as a shield for all of Europe, so collective efforts in this regard is a key for the preservation of peace and democracy.

DARIA MASLIENKOVA



UKRAINIAN ARTILLERYMEN FIRE FROM A FRENCH CAESAR SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER.



A UKRAINIAN PARATROOPER OPENS FIRE FROM AN N-LAW SYSTEM.

THE WAR IS NOT OVER YET

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, many around the world didn't believe our country would last even a few weeks. On various international platforms — including informal conversations with some world leaders — there were not only words of support but also expressions of irreversible sympathy.

Yet we endured. And we are still standing. Today, we celebrate the 34th anniversary of Ukraine's Independence — in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Lviv, and thousands of other cities and villages across the country. For the fourth consecutive year, under the conditions of a major war.

We stand, first and foremost, thanks to the heroism of Ukrainian soldiers and the resilience of Ukrainian society — all this time together, fiercely holding back the Russian onslaught. But we are certainly not standing alone.

From the very beginning of the invasion, international aid became critically important for us. Planes with weapons, humanitarian convoys, generators, medicines, support for refugees — the free world did not stand aside. And that changed everything.

There's a lot to be said about this. And there's a lot to tell. I still recall the first days of the invasion, when, together with colleagues from other countries, we handled not only global matters of Ukraine's resistance but also practical — yet equally essential — issues, like fuel supplies for our armored vehicles.

Alongside crucial diplomatic and humanitarian support from our partners, two other directions deserve special mention — military and economic aid.

I remember the moment in April 2022 when over fifty countries united under the Ramstein format — a global coalition for coordinating military support for Ukraine. It was through this platform that we received Patriot and IRIS-T air defense systems, HIMARS rocket systems, Leopard and Abrams tanks, missiles of various ranges, and, more recently, F-16 fighter jets. Our military trained with NATO colleagues. They learned quickly and adapted. Today, they are defending not just Ukraine — they are safeguarding European security and the entire civilized world.

As for financial support — I am deeply grateful to our partner governments, my colleagues in foreign ministries, and millions of people across the globe. Over the years, we've received tens of billions of dollars, which continue to help the Ukrainian government sustain our economy and provide reliable support for our troops.

At the same time, it's important to remember — helping Ukraine is not charity. It is an investment in shared security.

It's no secret that the Kremlin plans to go even further. And it's not just me saying this — Ukrainian intelligence, think tanks, and even NATO military officials confirm it. Russian officials themselves openly declare it, threatening European countries and even the United States with destruction by their missiles. Russian propagandists say it daily on state television. These aren't empty words — they reflect real plans and a dangerous worldview.

That is why I want to emphasize this: despite any difficulties or doubts, it is crucial to continue supporting Ukraine — with weapons, financially, diplomatically, politically, and culturally. The war is ongoing, and stopping it requires joint efforts. We are not asking for help out of weakness. On the contrary, it is about strength — the strength of Ukraine and its partners to act together and to win.

DMYTRIO KULEBA





DMYTRO KULEBA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE
(2020–2024)

PACE: UKRAINE'S DIPLOMATIC FRONT

Russian aggression against Ukraine has changed not only the security map of Europe, but also the system of international relations. In the 21st century, the world has faced the question: are democratic institutions capable of effectively counteracting war crimes, protecting human rights, and forming mechanisms of accountability for the aggressor.

In this context, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has become a key platform where not just discussions take place, but political and legal decisions are made. For Ukraine, PACE is not only a diplomatic platform, but a space where the foundations of international justice are laid: from recognizing the deportation of children as an act of genocide to promoting the idea of a special Tribunal for the crime of aggression.

During this period of war, the diplomatic front acquires special importance. It is here that it is decided whether European values will retain their practical force in conditions of unprecedented aggression, and whether the world will be able to build a new security architecture based on the Ukrainian experience of resistance and resilience.

Foreword by Volodymyr Savchenko,
CEO of The Ukrainian Review



Council of Europe conference room



COUNCIL OF THE EUROPE BUILDING

CHILDREN OF WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR RETURN

The mass deportation of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories has become one of the most shocking crimes of Russia. According to official data, there are over 19 thousand cases, but the real scale is much larger. Russia does not hide its policy: children are sent to Russian “re-education” camps, their names and dates of birth are changed, and new citizenships appear on documents. This is an attempt to erase Ukrainian roots and impose a foreign identity.

In 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Ombudsman Maria Lvova-Belova precisely because of the deportation of children. This became a landmark precedent: the world recognized this crime not only as a violation of humanitarian law, but also as a sign of genocide.

The Ukrainian delegation to PACE is promoting resolutions that provide for the creation of a European register of deportees, documentation of cases of forced adoption, and the application of personal sanctions to all those involved. As MP Olena Khomenko notes:

“Our task is to achieve the creation of an international return mechanism, where every child will have a chance to find their family. To this end, we are promoting the idea of a single European register of deported children and calling on partners to apply personal sanctions to all those involved in this crime.”

Thanks to diplomatic efforts and the support of third countries, more than 1,300 children have already been returned to Ukraine. But each such return is the result of long months of negotiations, mediation and risky operations. This proves that not only the heroism of individual teams is needed, but a systemic international repatriation mechanism.



**OLENA KHOMENKO, MEMBER OF
PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE AND CHAIR
OF THE PARLIAMENTARY NETWORK ON
THE SITUATION OF THE CHILDREN OF
UKRAINE**



ECOCIDE: ECOLOGY AS A WEAPON OF WAR

Russia's war against Ukraine has another dimension – an ecological one. Destroyed industrial facilities, flooded territories after the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station, fires at oil depots, pollution of the Black and Azov seas – all this creates chain reactions for human health and the environment on the continent.

The Ministry of Environment of Ukraine estimates the damage at over €85 billion. A third of Ukrainian forests have been damaged, large areas have been mined, and the level of greenhouse gas emissions from the war is comparable to the annual volumes of some countries.

A member of the delegation to the PACE, ecologist Yulia Ovchinnikova, emphasizes:

“Ecocide is not an abstraction. We are talking about concrete facts: the explosion of the Kakhovka dam led to the flooding of more than 600 km² of territories and the death of thousands of living creatures; protected areas, forests, and rivers suffer from missile strikes every day. Russia is deliberately turning ecology into a weapon.”

It was in the PACE that Ukraine initiated a discussion on including ecocide in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as the fifth international crime, along with genocide and the crime of aggression. The idea has already been supported by a number of states, and in Europe documents are being adopted that allow criminalizing actions that are “equal in scale to ecocide”.

For Ukraine, this is not only a matter of restoring nature, but also part of a global security strategy: after all, environmental destruction knows no borders and threatens future generations throughout Europe.



YULIA OVCHYNNIKOVA, MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION TO PACE



FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER GUNFIRE

Another front of the struggle is the information front. Russia is trying to silence those who document its crimes. Today, at least 30 Ukrainian journalists are in Russian captivity. A well-known example is journalist Viktoriya Roshchina, who died in captivity.

“Russia is trying to silence those who could witness its crimes. The kidnapping of journalists, fabricated cases, torture are a systemic policy,” notes Yevheniya Kravchuk, a member of the Ukrainian delegation to PACE.

The adopted resolutions demand the immediate release of all journalists and call for sanctions against the executioners. But this is not just about individual cases. The Ukrainian delegation consistently promotes the idea that an attack on journalists is an attack on the truth, and therefore on democracy as a whole.

In addition, Russia is waging a hybrid war, using the media, the church and even cultural projects as weapons. The Ukrainian delegation to PACE managed to officially record: RT and Sputnik are not media, but tools of disinformation. The role of the Russian Orthodox Church as a channel of state propaganda was also recognized.

An important step was the sanctions against companies working for the Russian military-industrial complex. This is a signal: business that feeds war cannot feel unpunished in Europe.



A photo of Victoria during the burial ceremony



YEVHENIYA KRAVCHUK, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE PARLIAMENTARY FACTION "SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE,"

**EXTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND
COMPENSATION: HUMANITARIAN
DIMENSION**

The full-scale war created the largest wave of migration in Europe since World War II. More than 6 million Ukrainians have received temporary protection status in EU countries, and another 4 million have become internally displaced persons.

In PACE, the issue of Ukrainian refugees goes beyond the humanitarian dimension. Long-term solutions are being discussed here: from access to education and medicine to the creation of an international register of damages and a fund for future compensation to Ukraine. These steps should become the basis for the restoration of the state after the war.



Ukrainian displaced persons

“Assistance to Ukrainian displaced persons and compensation for the damage caused are interrelated processes. If Europe demonstrates its readiness to compensate for the losses, millions of Ukrainians will know that their sacrifice was not in vain. We are seeking the creation of a transparent recovery fund, which will become a common instrument of responsibility and solidarity,” says Oleksiy Honcharenko, a member of the Ukrainian delegation to PACE.



**OLEKSIY HONCHARENKO, A
MEMBER OF THE UKRAINIAN
DELEGATION TO PACE.**

JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED

Accountability has always been one of the central demands voiced by the Ukrainian delegation in PACE. Condemning war crimes, supporting sanctions, documenting deportations and environmental destruction — all these steps lead to a broader goal: ensuring that the aggressor is punished and the victims receive justice.

Against this backdrop, the establishment of a Special International Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression of Russia against Ukraine has become a historic milestone. Enshrined in an Agreement with the Council of Europe following the Core Group meeting in Vienna, the Tribunal is a direct response to Ukraine's calls for accountability.

As early as February 25, 2022 the Ukrainian delegation to PACE called for Russia's expulsion and the launch of the process to create such a Tribunal.

Today it has become reality: no immunity for top officials, trials in absentia, no amnesties, protection of victims and witnesses, and real sentences — up to life imprisonment.

The tribunal will be hosted by the Netherlands. Next diplomatic efforts will focus on engaging various partners across the world to join multi-partial agreement on the set up of the Tribunal.

Another important element is the Register of Damage and Compensation mechanism: confiscated Russian assets are planned to be used for the purpose. This joint initiative of the Council of Europe, Ukraine and other Member States opens an opportunity for individuals, private and state companies, businesses to apply online for material and non-material losses (such as missing persons, captivity, illegal deportation, etc).



**MARIIA MEZENTSEVA, HEAD OF THE
UKRAINIAN DELEGATION TO PACE**

Yet justice is impossible without the return home of all civilians and military personnel from Russian captivity.

Head of the Ukrainian delegation to PACE Mariia Mezentseva emphasizes: "We cannot give a green light for any world leader to commit aggression with impunity... If there is no punishment in any legal form, it will encourage new aggressions, and that is why action must be taken right now."



SOLIDARITY AS A STRATEGY

PACE is shaping not only the response to current crimes, but also the architecture of future international justice. Here, the foundations of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression are being laid, a legal basis for compensation and liability is being created, and a joint strategy for information and environmental security is being formed.

None of these initiatives would be possible without the support of European partners. Every resolution adopted by consensus, every word of solidarity in the hall or on the sidelines is a contribution to a common victory.

On the diplomatic front, Ukraine is fighting not only for its own survival. It is about preserving European values - democracy, freedom of speech, the right of peoples to self-determination. And it is the unity in PACE that proves that Ukraine is not alone in this struggle.

ANNA OSTYMCHUK



ASSEMBLY HALL OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (PACE).

UKRAINE IS NOT “ONE OF THE TOPICS” BUT A CENTRAL PRIORITY, – BORYS TARASYUK,

The establishment of a Special Tribunal for Russia, the return of abducted Ukrainian children, the Compensation Mechanism and restoration are the main priorities of Ukrainians in the Council of Europe. We talked to Borys Tarasyuk about his activities as Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe and our plans for the rest of the year.

The Ukrainian delegation to PACE and the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe – how do you cooperate with each other? What is your personal mission as Permanent Representative?

We work as a united team. The delegation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine participates in the sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Permanent Representation provides diplomatic and analytical support upon request. As the Permanent Representative appointed by the President, I am responsible for organizing and maintaining constant communication of Ukrainian institutions and organizations with all Council of Europe bodies, protecting our interests, promoting our initiatives, in particular, to punish Russia for its aggression. This includes political, legal, and informational work.

What key stages in Ukraine's activities in the context of countering Russian aggression in the Council of Europe can you highlight? What achievements are you proud of?

After the start of Russia's full-scale aggression in February 2022, Ukraine immediately initiated a large-scale diplomatic offensive in the Council of Europe. The key and unprecedented decision was the expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe, which had not happened in the history of the organization since 1949. This became possible thanks to our active work with allies, consistent arguments and mobilization of the European community.

The second decisive stage was the creation of the Register of Damage, which was launched in 2023. It records all the damage caused by Russia, both to the state and to individuals. This is the first practical tool at the European level that paves the way for compensation to be paid to affected Ukrainians.

The next step is to develop a Special Tribunal to punish the crime of aggression against Ukraine. This is the most difficult but fundamental area. After all, it is through the crime of aggression that Russia committed all other crimes – murders, deportations, torture. We have already received political support, completed the development of the constituent documents, and are now working on launching the tribunal itself.

In addition, we were able to put the issue of supporting Ukraine on the permanent agenda of all Council of Europe bodies – the Committee of Ministers, PACE, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Venice Commission, and the Office of the Secretary General. Ukraine is not "one of the topics" but a central priority in the Council of Europe's policy.


BORYS TARASYUK,
PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF
UKRAINE TO THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
(2019-2025)



It is also important that our parliamentarians have achieved the recognition of Russia as an aggressor state and a state that finances terrorism in the texts of resolutions. This legally and politically underpins future international legal proceedings and reparations mechanisms.

I am personally proud that our team has consistently and effectively transformed the Council of Europe from a platform of general declarations into a platform of concrete decisions in favor of Ukraine. This is the result of daily diplomatic work - on the sidelines, at round tables, during meetings and negotiations. And this is just the beginning.

One of the main activities of our delegation to PACE is the creation of a Special Tribunal for Russia. You said that this requires Alain Berset to sign a bilateral agreement with Ukraine. The media predicted the creation of the tribunal back in May, but this did not happen. Why? What is the most realistic deadline for this process?

The expectations for May were optimistic. But on **25 June 2025**, President Zelenskyy and CoE's Secretary-General Berset formally signed the agreement and annexed Statute in Strasbourg. With the agreement now in place, the Council of Europe is preparing an Enlarged Partial Agreement to invite states and the EU to join. Once it's ratified and funding is confirmed, judicial appointments and administrative structures can begin. All parties expect the tribunal to be **operational in 2026**, with proceedings starting once key officials leave office or immunity is lifted

Do all Council of Europe members unanimously support the creation of a Special Tribunal for Russia? In particular, as Alain Berset said: "Justice also needs resources...", is the issue of financing the tribunal a cornerstone in the Council of Europe?

The overwhelming majority supports it, but there is a small group of countries that do not support the idea of bringing Russia to justice at all. However, we currently have enough support for our initiatives. The exact cost is still being calculated, but according to preliminary estimates, it will be comparable to the costs of other international or international specialized criminal tribunals. We are talking about tens of millions of euros – much less than in the case of large UN tribunals, but enough for a full-fledged launch and operation.

For reference:

- The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL): costs for 10 years exceeded 600 million euros (it was too expensive and non-transparent – exactly the kind of example Ukraine wants to avoid).
- The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): more than \$1.5 billion over the entire period of operation.
- The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): over \$2 billion.

We insist on an efficient and optimal model, without excessive bureaucratic burden. Within the Council of Europe, there is a mechanism of "enhanced partial agreement" that will allow for flexible voluntary funding from interested countries – both Council of Europe members and non-member states such as Canada, the United States or Japan.

So, funding is not the main obstacle. It is rather a matter of political will and agreeing on a scale of contributions. And we see that the support from our partners is real and gradual.

There used to be a lot of debate about the format of the tribunal, how it will work and its location – is there already a unified vision of the tribunal's work among the delegates?

Yes, over the past year, the negotiating team has made significant progress in resolving the most difficult issue – the format of the future Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.



Previously, there were different approaches: some countries advocated the creation of a tribunal based on existing international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). But we have made it clear that the ICC has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression unless both parties to the conflict have ratified the Rome Statute, and Russia has not done so.

Thanks to the active work of the Core Group of States (which includes Ukraine and many Council of Europe member states), a consolidated vision has been established: The Tribunal will be established as a separate international institution based on an agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, open to other countries. This will ensure independence, legitimacy and flexibility in the future work of the institution.

There was also broad agreement on the location: the tribunal's headquarters will most likely be in The Hague, along with other international courts. This is a logical and practical solution, given the infrastructure, experience, and symbolic weight of The Hague as the "world capital of international justice."

On May 13-14, the Committee of Ministers met in Luxembourg. What key decisions/events were significant for Ukraine at this meeting? What comments were made by countries that do not support the tribunal and the Compensation Mechanism for Ukraine?

It was an important event. During the session, Ukraine officially handed over a package of documents to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to launch the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression – a draft agreement with the Council of Europe, the Tribunal's Statute and a financial model. Secretary General Berset called it a historic step and called on member states to support the initiative politically and financially.

In addition, the Committee of Ministers reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supported the continuation of work on accountability mechanisms, including the full launch of the Register of Damage and preparations for the establishment of a compensation commission.

The implementation of the Council of Europe's Action Plan for Ukraine was also positively assessed, with special attention paid to the return of deported Ukrainian children.

Ukraine is creating a compensation mechanism. Could you tell us what kind of funds will be used to compensate Ukrainians – frozen Russian assets or do we still hope to receive reparations from the enemy? What do you see as the ideal scenario for this mechanism and what are the risks on the way to its implementation?

We believe that the main source should be frozen Russian assets in the EU, the US, Canada and other countries. They should be transferred to compensate Ukrainians, and this is a matter of justice. Reparations from Russia are unlikely in the short term. Risks include the political will of Western countries, legal difficulties and a long process. But we are already creating institutions that will allow us to start paying as soon as the resources are available.

What areas of work of our Mission to the Council of Europe will be developed in 2025-26 (except for the Special Tribunal)?

We are working in a comprehensive manner. Our priority is to launch the Compensation Commission, which will be the next step after the Register of Damage. This is critical for the start of real payments to Ukrainians who have lost their homes, businesses or relatives.

A separate area is the return of deported Ukrainian children. We support the work of the International Coalition and the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to keep this issue in the focus of the entire organization.

Another important issue is the return of prisoners of war and civilian hostages held by Russia. We insist on the access of international missions to the places of detention, recording the facts of torture and gross violations of the Geneva Conventions.

We will continue to work on post-war recovery – in the areas of judicial reform, electoral processes, and the protection of social rights. We will also work on countering Russian disinformation and monitoring the human rights situation in the occupied territories. Our task is to ensure that all these topics remain not only on the agenda of the Council of Europe, but also bring concrete results for people.

TETIANA STELMAKH



EUROPA BUILDING — MAIN SEAT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, BRUSSELS.

PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU IS NOT A ONE-WAY STREET, – AMBASSADOR VSEVOLOD CHENTSOV, REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE TO THE EU

Step by step, Ukraine is approaching its goal of joining the EU. In the course of this process, we face various challenges, such as the blocking of negotiations by Hungary and the postponement of the opening of Cluster 1. We talked to Ambassador Vsevolod Chentsov, Representative of Ukraine to the EU, who told us about the mood of the European community, our advantages and main challenges in the accession process.

On April 30, the EU Ambassador to Ukraine, Katarína Matherňová, stated that the separation of Ukraine's and Moldova's accession processes to the EU is currently not being considered. In your opinion, why have the negotiations not yet been opened? How might this affect our European integration process?

Ukraine and Moldova are moving in a synchronized manner through the EU membership negotiation process. We share a common calendar of screening meetings – both countries are completing the legislative screening by September, and both are demonstrating significant progress in reforms.



**VSEVOLOD CHENTSOV,
REPRESENTATIVE OF
UKRAINE TO THE EU**



Currently, the opening of Cluster 1, “Fundamentals,” is being blocked. Delays and unjustified obstructions in the negotiation process undermine the EU’s core principle – the merit-based approach.

Since, under the enlargement methodology, Cluster 1 must be opened first, its blockage prevents the opening of other negotiation clusters. At the same time, to avoid wasting time, Ukraine and Moldova are cooperating with the European Commission to technically prepare for the opening of negotiation clusters.

Do all EU member states want to see Ukraine in the Union? For example, there are reports that Hungary is taking a negative stance, particularly through blocking negotiations to secure expanded rights for its minority. Should we perceive this as lobbying of its own interests through some kind of blackmail?

We have the support of 26 member states for opening Cluster 1. In order to unblock the negotiation process, the Ukrainian side proposed an algorithm – agreeing with the Hungarian side on an action plan regarding the protection of national minorities.

The Ukrainian side prepared and submitted this action plan to the Hungarian side. On April 29, the first bilateral meeting was held to discuss the protection of minority rights, and on May 26, the second meeting took place at the expert level concerning the protection of minority rights in the educational sphere.

However, the Ukrainian side has not yet received Hungary’s agreement to the proposed algorithm for unblocking the opening of Cluster 1. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Andrii Sybiha reiterated Ukraine’s readiness to continue constructive dialogue with Hungary during the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels on May 20, 2025.


What kind of partner does the EU see in us: a promising destination for investment and a source of agricultural products, or merely a market for its own goods? Should we expect an influx of EU products, and more importantly, will we be able to withstand the competition?

The European Union sees Ukraine as a strategic partner, particularly in the agricultural sector. We are able to supply a significant part of the EU’s needs for critical agricultural products. Our agricultural sector has a number of key advantages: big production volumes, flexibility, high quality products and the ability to quickly adapt to new realities.

Given the global shortage of protein and the growing demand for high-quality, environmentally friendly agricultural products, the Ukrainian agricultural sector has every chance to become not just the “breadbasket of Europe” but a technologically advanced partner capable of providing sustainable and competitive exports. This opens the way to creating added value domestically and strengthening our position in the EU market.

However, this partnership is not a one-way street – opening our market to European goods also means increased competition. EU goods are often backed by strong market positions and subsidies, which will undoubtedly create additional challenges for Ukrainian producers.

To this end, integration into the EU Single Market will require not only economic preparedness but also subtle diplomacy, a balanced agricultural policy, and a readiness to make compromises. Nevertheless, if we approach this process systematically and strategically, Ukraine will not only withstand the competition but also secure a new, pivotal role in the future EU Common Agricultural Policy. Ukraine and the EU can jointly access other markets and contribute to the global food security.



How would you assess Ukraine's readiness for EU membership? Which sectors are least prepared for integration, and which are most aligned with EU requirements?

The negotiation process consists of specific stages. Currently, as part of the bilateral screening of legislation, an assessment is being made regarding the alignment with EU norms. During the screening sessions, the Ukrainian side presents the European Commission with a concrete schedule for bringing national legislation fully in line with EU standards. The European Commission also provides its own assessment in reports following the completion of screening within each negotiation cluster.

At the same time, based on the screening results, the Ukrainian side is developing a national legislative adaptation program, which will become the reform matrix for the membership negotiation process. For example, Ukraine's digital transformation and energy market reforms are already strongly aligned with EU frameworks.

It is also important to note that European integration reforms and the process of legislative approximation began under the Ukraine–EU Association Agreement and continue today. Our progress is evaluated in the European Commission's annual report as part of the enlargement package, and the Commission's recommendations are implemented based on relevant government action plans.

In other words, the EU accession negotiation process is a structured process involving specific stages. A country's compliance with the reform timeline and legislative alignment is the key determinant of its readiness for EU membership.

Marta Kos stated that if the pace of negotiations with Ukraine on EU membership continues, the Union could open all clusters in the negotiation process by autumn of this year. How likely is this, given Hungary's resistance to opening Cluster 1?

In September, we are completing the legislative screening for all six clusters. Technically, the European Commission and the Ukrainian and Moldovan sides will be ready to open all clusters in autumn 2025. However, the formal opening of negotiations for Cluster 1 and the others requires the unanimous agreement of all EU member states.

What is the role of the European Parliament in supporting Ukraine on its path to EU membership and in countering Russia's war against Ukraine?

Under the leadership of President Roberta Metsola, who has been a vocal and consistent advocate for Ukraine, the European Parliament has played a unique political role in mobilizing support across the EU and worldwide. It was among the first to call for granting Ukraine EU candidate status and continues to advocate for the opening of accession negotiations. Following the 2024 elections, the Parliament's support has grown even stronger reflecting the will of European citizens, as MEPs are directly elected and represent their voices.

The Parliament has adopted numerous resolutions calling for increased aid, tougher sanctions on Russia and its allies, and the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. It has also called for the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's reconstruction and to support the country's resilience in the face of ongoing Russian aggression. Such strong political position significantly contributes to our ability to accumulate political support, push for necessary decisions and demonstrates to the people of Ukraine that the European Union stands firmly by their side.

I would also like to note that parliamentary cooperation between Ukraine and the EU has reached an unprecedented level: in 2023 a new format of committee-to-committee cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament has been established to support Ukraine's legislative alignment with the EU. Committees now exchange views regularly on a broad range of topics, and I believe this format is an excellent instrument – not only for accelerating our European integration by learning directly from EU lawmakers, but also for contributing to shaping our shared European future.

Who needs whom more: the EU as a guarantor of security and economic development for Ukraine, or Ukraine as an experienced country in the fields of defence and agriculture for the EU?

Ukraine is already one of the key suppliers of agricultural products to the EU, and against this background, our importance will only grow. The EU, which is increasingly focusing on sustainable food policy, needs a reliable and close source of quality agricultural products. Unlike distant markets of third countries, Ukrainian export is logistically more convenient, more flexible, and able to ensure stable supplies even in times of global instability.



One of the first photos from Euromaidan, 2013

It is especially important that, as a future EU Member State, Ukraine is already proactively implementing European production standards. This means that we are not just aspiring to join the EU, but are already de facto working according to its rules. In addition, Ukraine's unique experience in countering full-scale military aggression makes it a key contributor to Europe's collective defence and resilience.

By integrating Ukraine into the EU's security architecture, the Union strengthens its own strategic autonomy and gains a partner that has already withstood hybrid threats, cyberattacks, and conventional warfare.

At the same time, Ukraine needs the EU as a space of opportunities. Therefore, this is not a matter of who needs whom more.

This is a strategic partnership in which strong agrarian and resilient Ukraine can strengthen Europe's food autonomy and security, and Europe can accelerate the technological transformation of our agricultural sector while reinforcing its defence capabilities through deeper cooperation with Ukraine.

In your view, is EU membership a sufficient security guarantee for Ukraine? In the event of a hypothetical renewed Russian attack on our country, should we expect a more decisive and concrete response from our allies?

EU membership is an important part of Ukraine's security strategy, but it is not, by itself, a guarantee against military aggression. The EU is a political and economic union, not a military alliance – this is why NATO remains key in providing concrete security guarantees.

Still, accession to the EU would significantly strengthen Ukraine's resilience, reduce vulnerability to external threats, and deepen defence cooperation with member states. It is equally important to advance bilateral defence partnerships and develop a broader network of security guarantees.

European integration is a strategic choice that not only enhances Ukraine's defence capabilities but also enables deeper integration of the European and Ukrainian defence industries, contributing to the EU's overall security and strategic autonomy.

TETIANA STELMAKH

*THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED ON 12 JUNE 2025



THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PROGRAMS FROM UKRAINE TO SUPPORT FARMERS

In total, the state budget for 2025 allocates more than UAH 6 billion to support farmers. The main areas of support for farmers in 2025:

PROGRAM “AFFORDABLE LOANS 5-7-9”

- Farmers can receive loans of up to UAH 90 million at 5-9% per annum. Starting from January 1, 2025, loans under the “Affordable Loans 5-7-9” program will be provided to agricultural producers (prolonged) provided that they have registered with the State Agency for Agrarian Policy.
- The Government has recently expanded the opportunities for farmers to build vegetable storage facilities. This is important news for Ukrainian vegetable farmers. It opens up new opportunities under the Affordable Loans 5-7-9% program. From now on, agricultural producers investing in the construction of vegetable and potato storage facilities will be able to benefit from government support in the form of loan interest rate compensation of up to UAH 150 million, as well as livestock and processing companies.
- In total, since the beginning of 2025, more than 3,000 farms have already received almost UAH 18 billion in loans. In 2024, 8,750 farms received UAH 46.9 billion in loans under this program.

SUPPORT FOR FARMS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS:



4.73 BILLION UAH for subsidies for cultivated land and livestock, including support for farms in the de-occupied territories.



1.42 BILLION UAH for subsidies for cattle (from 3 to 100 heads, UAH 7 thousand per head).



472.5 MILLION UAH to support the breeding stock of goats and sheep (from 5 to 500 heads, UAH 2 thousand per head).



1 BILLION UAH for the development of livestock and agricultural processing.



COMPENSATION FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING COSTS



1 BILLION UAH

For the demining of agricultural land to restore agricultural production in the affected regions.

LENDING TO FARMERS



80 MILLION UAH

For affordable lending to farmers for business development and modernization.

DEVELOPMENT GRANTS



1.37 BILLION UAH

Under the program "Provision of grants for business creation or development".



479.5 MILLION UAH

for the development of horticulture, berry growing, viticulture and greenhouse farming:



320.5 MILLION UAH

For affordable lending to farmers for business development and modernization.



159 MILLION UAH

For greenhouses

SUPPORT FOR RECLAMATION, FISH FARMING AND FARMS



205 MILLION UAH

To support producers using reclaimed land, compensation of unified social tax to family farmers, and assistance to fish producers in the de-occupied and affected areas.

LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT

- Reimbursement of the cost of breeding animals.
- Subsidies for livestock growth.
- Compensation for construction and reconstruction of livestock farms.

As for the lost machinery, there is a state program to compensate 25% of the cost of purchased domestic agricultural machinery. In particular, according to the Ministry of Economy, in the first 8 months of the program in 2024, farmers received almost UAH 877 million in compensation for the cost of agricultural machinery.

A 25% PROGRAM FOR FARMERS TO PURCHASE DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY:

- 3,419 agricultural enterprises renewed their machinery fleet
- 5,311 units of machinery worth over UAH 4.2 billion purchased
- Almost UAH 877 million in compensation paid
- 33 banks joined the program
- The equipment catalog includes 11,848 items from 138 manufacturers
- About 1000 new jobs created

TETIANA STELMAKH



FROM TITANIUM AND LITHIUM TO ESPER HAND. NATURAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN POTENTIAL OF UKRAINE

In recent months, the key topic in the world's leading media has been the discussion and signing of an agreement between Ukraine and the United States of America on joint mineral extraction. Ukraine has the largest explored deposits of certain types of extremely valuable rare minerals in Europe. But when discussing the possibility of large-scale extraction of valuable minerals, many people forget about other equally important potentials and prospects that Ukraine has accumulated, has and is developing. These include agriculture, which is beginning to recover even during a full-scale war, certain business segments that can successfully compete with Western companies in terms of the quality of goods and services, the military-industrial complex, which is turning into a high-tech monster, and Ukrainian science, which provides qualified personnel for all of the above industries.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

According to the State Service of Geology and Subsoil of Ukraine, the country has a unique mineral resource base, the wealth of which is due to the peculiar geological structure of its territory. Prior to the Russian aggression, more than 20,000 deposits of 117 of the world's 120 most used metals and minerals were discovered in Ukraine's subsoil, more than half of these deposits were of industrial importance, and more than two thousand mining, processing and enrichment enterprises operated on the basis of these deposits.

Ukraine has the ability to meet both its own needs and export such important minerals and products of their processing as iron, manganese, titanium, zirconium, potassium salt, table salt, sulfur, bentonite clay, graphite, kaolin, flux raw materials, clay for refractories, and decorative and facing materials,

– was written in the publication Mineral Resources of the State Service of Geology and Mineral Resources of Ukraine

The Canadian geopolitical risk analysis firm SecDev conducts its own research on the types and volumes of Ukrainian mineral resources. The volume of deposits and production of valuable and rare minerals in Ukraine before the full-scale Russian invasion and annexation of the territories is impressive.



Boryslav is one of the oldest and most significant oil production centers in Europe.

Ukraine has a rich profusion of mineral resources and belongs to major countries with abounding mineral resources... The unique quality mineral deposits located conveniently for the development of mining complexes represent a number of Ukraine's minerals. In Ukraine a large-scale extraction of kaolin (18% of global volume), manganese (10%) and iron (4%) ores, uranium, titan, zirconium, germanium, graphite (4%), as well as bromine, ochre, non-metallic metallurgical raw materials (quartzite, fluxing limestone and dolomite), chemical raw materials (brimstone, rock and potassium salt), facing stone (granite, gabbro, labradorite), and glass sand is under way.

Ukraine also has significant reserves of fuel and energy raw materials in its subsoil. Prior to the Russian aggression, geological exploration was carried out and new fields were discovered.

Oil and gas fields in Ukraine are concentrated in three regions: Eastern (238 fields), Western (111 fields) and Southern (42 fields). The publication Mineral Resources of Ukraine:

The State Balance of Mineral Reserves of Ukraine accounts for natural gas reserves in 391 fields: on-balance sheet (recoverable) in the amount of 993,296 million m³ and off-balance sheet – 20,453 million m³. It should be noted that 95.1% of gas reserves are concentrated in 376 onshore fields, and 4.9% in 15 offshore fields of the Azov and Black Seas. In 2013, 5 fields were discovered in Ukraine within the Eastern region. Prospective free gas resources of 756,469 million m³ were estimated in 172 prospective areas prepared for deep drilling and 146 undiscovered layers of fields.

Ukraine has 190 oil fields and 211 gas condensate fields. 53% of proven oil reserves are located in the eastern regions. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Ukraine produced 1,654 thousand tons of oil per year (76.15% of total Ukrainian production).

Ukraine ranks first in Europe and 7th in the world in terms of geological reserves of fossil coal. Ukraine has over 41 billion tons of coal reserves. The hard coal reserves are mainly distributed in two basins — Donetsk and Lviv-Volyn. As a result of the 2014 aggression, the most modern coal mining enterprises in Donetsk and Luhansk regions came under Russian control. At the beginning of 2025, due to the approaching hostilities, Pokrovske Mine Administration, the only one in Ukraine and one of the largest coking coal mining enterprises in Europe, stopped working.



CRITICAL MINERALS ARE THE TREASURES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Ukraine's subsoil is rich in minerals that are considered critically important. Yulia Svyrydenko, Prime Minister of Ukraine:

We will extract critical materials and create products from them. Ukraine has the largest reserves of lithium, titanium and significant deposits of other minerals in Europe.




MYKHAILO NEPRAN,
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT
OF THE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY AND A
MEMBER OF THE
UKRAINIAN BUSINESS
COUNCIL

Ukraine is among the top five countries in the world in terms of graphite reserves, which amount to about 19 million tons of ore with natural graphite content of 5-8%. Six deposits have been explored, one of which currently produces 5.5 thousand tons of graphite concentrate annually.

Lithium is another strategic mineral that has been explored but not yet mined in Ukraine. The main areas where lithium is used are in the ceramic and glass industries, in the production of lubricants, synthetic rubber and plastics, air conditioners, and agricultural chemicals. In recent years, however, lithium has been used in other areas, making it one of the most sought-after metals in the world. Due to its efficient energy storage per unit weight, lithium has become almost indispensable in the production of batteries for electric vehicles, mobile phones, etc. Its estimated reserves in Ukraine are 500 thousand tons. This is about 2-3% of the world's reserves.

The country has about 1% of the world's titanium reserves (8 million tons). Prior to the full-scale invasion, it accounted for 7% of the world's titanium ore and titanium concentrate production. Ukraine's confirmed nickel reserves are estimated at 215 thousand tons, out of global reserves of 58 million tons. In addition, nickel ores contain cobalt, which is estimated to be up to 100 thousand tons in Ukraine, or slightly less than 1% of the world's reserves.



One of the largest explored lithium ore deposits, Shevchenkivske, is located on the eastern outskirts of the village of Shevchenko in Velykonovosilkovsky district of Donetsk region. The deposit was discovered in 1982. Among the minerals are lithium ores and associated minerals: tantalum ores, niobium ores, beryllium ores. Today, only 3 kilometers separate the completely destroyed village from the front line. As late as the end of last year, a few locals could be found here. Among them were those who participated in the exploration of the deposit 42 years ago. An exploration expedition from Novomoskovsk (now the city of Samar in Dnipropetrovska oblast) hired villagers as auxiliary workers. At that time, there was no significant demand for lithium, so geological exploration was the only thing they did.

From the presentation by Ukrainian scientists Svitlana Vasylenko (PhD (Geology) Senior Researcher at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Ulyana Naumenko, Senior Research Scientist at the Institute of Geology Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine at the International Scientific Discussion: Problems, Challenges and Prospects conference, Brighton, UK:

Ukraine can be considered the richest country in Europe in terms of proven reserves and explored resources of lithium. Ukraine can fully meet its own needs and supply lithium raw materials to the Western European market. The Shevchenkivske spodumene ore deposit can be considered the most attractive in terms of current conditions and trends in the global and Western European lithium markets.



As of 2023, the total value of Ukraine's mineral reserves amounted to

\$14.8 TRILLION



Out of 118 elements of the periodic system, **92** have been found in Ukraine



42% of all metal deposits in Ukraine are located in the temporarily occupied territories





Ukraine has deposits of **21** out of **30** elements identified by the European Commission as critical raw materials, including rare earth elements: lithium, titanium, graphite, cobalt and nickel



The full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation has had an extremely negative impact on mining and related industries. Mykhailo Nepran, First Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a member of the Ukrainian Business Council said:

Doing business during the war is risky... If we are talking about the Ukrainian economy, the State Statistics Service does not have clear statistics that would show how many contracts have been terminated, how many investments have not been received. We can estimate this by other indicators.

One important indicator is exports. In 2021, Ukraine exported \$68 billion worth of goods, with the largest share going to metals and metal products, minerals, and food in third place. And in 2024, agricultural products were in the first place, and not just food, but raw materials such as sunflower, corn, and wheat. Metals and ores came next, mostly as raw materials, not finished products. Exports have decreased from \$68 billion to \$21 billion. This is the deindustrialization of exports, unfortunately. This was caused by the hostilities and the loss of large enterprises in Mariupol, where there were two metallurgical giants.





ONE OF THE LITHIUM DEPOSITS IN UKRAINE.

A FLAGSHIP OPERATING DURING THE WAR AND STOLEN GRAIN

So, agriculture is now a leader in exports. How has the war affected this traditionally key Ukrainian industry?

Before Russia's full-scale aggression, Ukraine's agricultural land totaled 41.3 million hectares, 68.5% of the country's total area. Of this agricultural land, 32.7 million hectares were arable land (cropland). By comparison, France and Spain have 27.4 million and 23.9 million hectares of agricultural land in use, respectively. The annual growth of Ukraine's agricultural sector was 5-6%. Ukraine was a leader in international trade in sunflower oil (first in the world), rapeseed and barley (third and fourth, respectively) and other products, and was among the five largest grain exporters in the world; farmers exported three quarters of what they produced, while domestic grain consumption was only 20-25%.

Denys Marchuk, Deputy Chair of the Ukrainian Agrarian Council:


2021 was one of the record years, we harvested more than 100 million tons of oilseeds, the country was gaining momentum, and the development potential was improving every year. But with the occupation, we lost about 20% of our land, about 5 million hectares were occupied. After the de-occupation of parts of Kharkiv and Kherson regions, we managed to return about 1.7 million hectares of agricultural land, where we cannot work because everything is mined and covered with artillery shells.

It may seem unbelievable, but in 2024, Ukrainian farmers exported oilseeds worth even more than in 2021 – \$24.8 billion. According to Denys Marchuk, Deputy Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Agrarian Council, this was due to rising prices on world markets. Mr. Marchuk emphasizes that today Ukrainian farmers lack sown areas.

What is the fate of the agricultural land occupied by the Russians? Some of it was nationalized, some of the land was transferred to collaborators. Ukrainian farmers who left the occupied territories felt a double blow. Denys Marchuk:

Those farmers who have lost their land and left, they have no support in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Agrarian Council initiated a bill that freezes loan payments for these farmers. They have left and lost everything, but banks are demanding that they pay both the principal and interest. The bill was passed in the first reading. We are asking to freeze payments to these producers for the duration of the war and for a year after the war. This would be an important and correct signal that we have not abandoned our people.

The Russian aggressor has occupied more than 100 thousand square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. Along with the population, production facilities, minerals, and agricultural land. But this was not enough for the occupiers. In the occupied territories, they began stealing Ukrainian grain in huge quantities.



According to the KibOrg project team, which investigates Russian crimes in Ukraine, in 2023 alone, Ukraine lost at least 8.5 million tons of crops due to the occupation of the southern and eastern regions. Thus, the grain grown in the occupied part of Kherson region was exported by Russians to Rostov region and Krasnodar Territory, and other regions of the Russian Federation.

But Russians have always been characterized by cunning and cynicism. They not only steal Ukrainian grain for their own needs, but also supply it to different countries, sometimes at a reduced price, almost as a charity, and some of these supplies are even made with the assistance of the UN.

Ukrainian journalist Kateryna Yaresko monitors and documents Russian exports of Ukrainian grain to Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Iran, and Yemen. She said:

Unfortunately, the sanctions policy regarding the theft and export of grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories is hardly ever applied. Only a few vessels have been sanctioned, for example, the bulk carrier Enisei, which exported Melitopol grain to Venezuela from occupied Sevastopol in April 2024, was subject to European sanctions in June 2024. However, many vessels involved in the export of such grain are not covered by the global sanctions policy.



**DENYS MARCHUK, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
OF THE UKRAINIAN AGRARIAN COUNCIL**





At the moment, there is no reason to even hope for a tough sanctions policy. On the contrary, sometimes the international community not only turns a blind eye to the crimes of the Russian occupiers, but also assists in the export of stolen grain. Kateryna Yaresko has gathered a solid evidence base of how the Russians exported wheat harvested in the occupied districts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to the Houthi-controlled Yemeni port of Saleef. It may seem paradoxical, but the grain supply was authorized by the UN mission – the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM). In total, 3 voyages of the Russian-flagged ZAFAR cargo ship from Sevastopol to Yemen were documented. Moreover, the Houthis received stolen Ukrainian grain at a cost below the market price.



***One of the Crimean ports through which
Russia exports stolen Ukrainian grain***

Of course, the Russian aggressor uses grain for political influence. It uses complex schemes to conceal the origin of the grain and manipulates prices, so it is not always possible to understand the real goals. For example, wheat from the occupied Ukrainian territory was imported to Syria at prices one and a half times higher than market prices. This means that there are hidden additional agreements or corruption. And grain was supplied to Iran and Yemen at below-market prices. We can assume that Russia receives certain goods or services for this. Unfortunately, this is not recorded in the documents, and we do not know the true content of these agreements, – said Kateryna Yaresko.



KEMPINSKI HOTEL ODESA: DESTROYED ON SEPTEMBER 25, 2023 FOLLOWING A RUSSIAN MISSILE STRIKE.

BIONICS THAT GIVES A FULL LIFE

One example of a business that is developing during a full-scale war, creating high-tech products, entering global markets, and expanding its production facilities in Ukraine is Esper Bionics, a startup. Highly qualified specialists develop bionic prostheses with intuitive control technology.

The company is currently focusing on increasing production of its flagship product, Esper Hand. This is a self-learning bionic prosthesis that uses digital signal processing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning technologies. It learns user behavior, predicts and intuitively changes movements, and allows performing everyday tasks with human-like dexterity.

Human augmentation is the key to unlocking the full potential of humanity, and we are dedicated to advancing this technology for the betterment of all, – the founders of the project are convinced.

Esper Bionics was founded by Ukrainian enthusiasts in 2019. And in 2022, its first product, a bionic hand prosthesis, was named one of the best inventions of 2022 by Time magazine. The bionic robotic hand was called a prosthesis with amazing accuracy and one of the best inventions of mankind.

The company's prostheses have US quality certificates, and until 2022, they were mainly supplied to this country. After the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian veterans began receiving artificial limbs for free.

The main production facilities are concentrated in Kyiv. In total, the project employs 70 specialists, mostly Ukrainians, with an average age of 30. The company continues to expand its production capacity and staff, which undergoes special additional training, says Bogdan Diorditsa, Head of Esper for Ukraine.



**BOGDAN DIORDITSA, HEAD OF ESPER FOR
UKRAINE**

We can't search for and invite people from other companies because there are no other similar companies in Ukraine. So we are looking for people who are familiar with the area we need, and we train them additionally. Because we have very fine soldering of materials, small electronics... These are not always people with technical education: we have operators of CNC machines, specialists who are extremely scarce in Ukraine, and they have a theater education, but it so happened that they themselves studied to become technical specialists.

Last year, Esper Bionics attracted \$5 million in investments to expand production and increase the number of employees. This allowed the company to increase the production of bionic prostheses to 500 per year. Further development is planned in 2025: obtaining quality certificates to enter European markets in the second quarter, as well as attracting new investments to increase existing production and create new products.

If we're talking about the prosthetic industry, historically, both during the First and Second World Wars, these are the times when such companies get a very strong push forward, – he said.

At the same time, the company launched a volunteer project to employ veterans with prosthetic limbs. Bogdan Diorditsa:

At first, it was chaotic and spontaneous, but over time, we realized that updating a person's functionality is not only about replacing a limb with an artificial one, but also about providing an opportunity to work. This is a very complex task involving psychologists, therapists, psychiatrists, and career counselors. And, of course, explaining to businesses that hiring veterans is not only a social responsibility, but also a very big business advantage.



EDUCATION AND SCIENCE: DEVELOPMENT DESPITE THE WAR



Education and science are the areas that determine the future of the country. And the Russian aggressors have not managed to destroy them either. On the contrary, even in wartime, these sectors have shown flexibility, continued their development, responded to the needs of the times, and supported the armed forces of Ukraine.

Paradoxically, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the number of students in higher education in Ukraine has increased from 105,000 to 170,000. This may be partly due to a desire to avoid mobilization. At the same time, every university has teachers and students who have voluntarily joined the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, in early 2025, dozens of students and faculty from Mechnikov Odesa National University are defending the country.

We are in touch with them and there are numerous cases of students mastering the curriculum despite their participation in hostilities, even taking exams directly from the trenches. I believe that this is one of the most striking proofs of our students' thirst for knowledge. We must and will remember everyone in the university community who gave their lives for the right to be free! – said Vyacheslav Truba, Rector of the I. I. Mechnikov ONU.

Despite the war, students from other countries have not left Ukraine. Today, 27,000 foreigners study at Ukrainian universities. These are primarily citizens of countries such as China, India, and Azerbaijan. Thanks to a fairly high-quality system of higher education, before the full-scale war, Ukraine earned \$3 billion from teaching foreign students.

Dmytro Shevchuk, Vice-Rector for Research and Teaching, The National University of Ostroh Academy:



VYACHESLAV TRUBA, RECTOR OF THE
ODESA I.I. MECHNIKOV NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY

I think we will restore and improve this potential. Our university, for example, conducts research on military psychology, psychosocial support, community resilience analysis, and the development of effective veteran policies very intensively and in a short time. Not to mention robotic systems and computer technologies for managing complex processes. All of this forms the basis of new courses and educational programs. I am sure that such proposals will be of interest to foreigners.

But Ukrainian higher education institutions do not only provide educational services to foreigners. Support from Ukraine's partner countries is extremely important today. For example, Mechnikov Odesa National University was a partner of the University of Gdansk in the Polish Academic Exchange Program, which aims to increase the academic mobility of Ukrainians to Poland. The interaction of Ukrainian students and teachers with European universities under a similar German program is also growing.

Thanks to the support of the World Bank and international partners of the Ministry of Education and Science, ONU, as a university that merged with another university as a result of reorganization, has 11 projects at various stages of implementation, which allows it to modernize and purchase unique scientific equipment.

The double degree program was introduced by the Semen Kuznets Kharkiv National University of Economics through international cooperation. Students have the opportunity to get additional education and work experience at European and British universities. For example, the university has become a member of the Twinning project, which has developed and is implementing a double degree program with a British university.

Currently, there are 19 active grant programs of various levels at KNEU. To ensure the quality of education and improve international cooperation, university teams participate in projects of the European University Association EUA and the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD.

PETRO CHUMAKOV

Logos of Ukrainian universities.



**НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ
"ОСТРОЗЬКА АКАДЕМІЯ"**



**DMYTRO SHEVCHUK, VICE-RECTOR
FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING, THE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF OSTROH
ACADEMY:**



NOT ONLY UKRAINE IS INTEGRATING INTO EUROPE, BUT EUROPE IS ALSO INTEGRATING INTO UKRAINE

The dominant narrative of our time is familiar: Ukraine strives to join the European Union, embracing the long road of reforms to one day stand as part of a stable, secure, and prosperous European community. But in 2025, that view tells only half the story. Increasingly, it's no longer a one-way street. Europe is also integrating into Ukraine.

IT MAY SOUND BOLD — BUT THE FACTS SUPPORT IT

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has become the epicenter of European security. Ukrainian territory has served as the continent's most brutal and instructive military testing ground since World War II. From Bakhmut to Avdiivka, from anti-drone jamming systems to NATO-standard battlefield coordination, Ukraine has pioneered modern warfare tactics in real time.

NATO officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian troops are “among the most experienced combat forces in Europe,” with over 1 million people mobilized into defense roles as of mid-2025. Military technologies, such as the German IRIS-T air defense systems and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, have been tested under the most intense battlefield conditions — feedback from Ukrainian soldiers has directly influenced updates to these systems.

EUROPEAN ARMIES ARE WATCHING — AND LEARNING

Poland increased its defense budget to 4.2% of GDP in 2024, the highest in NATO after the U.S., and aims to have 300,000 active personnel by 2030. The Baltic States have ramped up spending and joint drills with Ukraine, while France and Germany have both committed to long-term rearmament programs not seen in decades. The message is clear: Ukraine's war is not isolated — it's a warning shot for all of Europe.

In this context, Ukraine is not a petitioner knocking on the EU's door. It is a partner at the table. If Ukraine falls, Russian forces could reach the borders of Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. If it holds — as it has for over three years — Europe not only gains a new member, but also a battle-tested defender capable of enhancing the continent's collective security.



ARTEM KASPIAN, THE
UKRAINIAN REVIEW
PROJECT PARTNER, LAWYER
AND A CIVIL ACTIVIST.

BUT UKRAINE OFFERS MORE THAN JUST MILITARY STRENGTH

It is also a functioning democracy under siege — a rare feat in modern history. In early 2025, the Ukrainian government introduced a controversial amendment to restructure oversight of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) — agencies central to Ukraine's EU reform commitments.

The public reacted swiftly. Despite ongoing air raid sirens and the daily threat of Shahed drone strikes, thousands peacefully protested in Kyiv and other cities. What followed was remarkable: no police violence, no crackdowns, no suppression. The government listened, admitted its mistake, and reversed the legislation. That's not theoretical democracy — it's democracy in action, under fire.

This moment revealed something deeper: political maturity and civic courage. Ukraine is not just surviving; it is evolving — setting democratic examples even as missiles fall.

That's why the old term "European integration" no longer captures the full picture.

What we are witnessing is mutual integration. Europe needs Ukraine as much as Ukraine needs Europe — for its resilience, its combat knowledge, its civic energy, and its moral clarity. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, 76% of Europeans now view Ukraine's defense as directly tied to their own security, a dramatic shift since 2021.

THE CENTER OF GRAVITY IN EUROPE IS SHIFTING

It is no longer just in Brussels, Paris, or Berlin. It now extends to Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Lviv — cities that fight not only for themselves, but for the values Europe holds dear: freedom, sovereignty, democracy.

Ukraine is not just joining Europe. It is helping to define it.

This is no longer just about Ukraine integrating into Europe.

This is Europe integrating into Ukraine.

ARTEM KASPARIAN



LITHUANIAN SCENARIO 2.0?

WAR AND EUROPE REDEFINE UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR POWER

Ukraine is not the first country to reform its energy system on its way to the EU. The Republic of Lithuania has gone through a difficult and long twenty-year reform process. At the request of the EU, on February 19, 2001, the government of the Republic approved a program for the shutdown and subsequent decommissioning of the first unit of the Ignalina NPP. In 2004, the first unit of the plant was shut down, and in 2009, the second. In 2010, dismantling of the plant's equipment and systems began.

Klaudijus Maniokas, partner at ESTEP, public sector consultancy, former deputy to both the Chief Negotiator and Director General of the European Committee under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, told The Ukrainian Review about this experience:

In fact we had this issue in our negotiations because Ignalina Power Nuclear Station was considered unsaved by design just because it was the same design as Chernobyl. So, despite all investments that were made into it, it was a kind of political decision, but the Chernobyl-type could not operate in the EU.

So, yes, we tried to change this decision, but I think it was politically beyond us. And as we see now, 20 years later, if we wouldn't agree to it, we wouldn't be allowed to enter the EU.

According to Klaudijus Maniokas, the EU was responsible for financing the closure of the Ignalina plant and, accordingly, the search for new sources of electricity supply. Approximately EUR 1 billion was allocated for this purpose. These funds were used to provide financial assistance to the dismissed workers of the plant.



INGALIN NUCLEAR PLANT

The closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant increased Lithuania's dependence on Russian electricity and gas supplies for at least 10 years while alternative sources were being sought. However, as of today, all of Lithuania's needs are met by electricity imports from other EU countries and green electricity resources, including solar and wind.



KLAUDIJUS MANIOKAS,
FORMER DEPUTY TO BOTH THE
CHIEF NEGOTIATOR AND
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE UNDER
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

One of the conditions for joining the EU was integration into the EU energy market. This required building a new system of energy networks to neighboring countries. This process lasted about 20 years and was successfully completed in February 2025, when Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia finally disconnected from the Russian grid and joined the network of European transmission system operators.

And second, there was an agreement that they would help us to basically build our links to the neighboring countries and to basically to end isolation of the Baltic states in the energy market of the EU. It meant building bridges, building lines with the continental system. And it took 20 years, – said Klaudijus Maniokas.

Another EU requirement was the liberalization of the electricity market (a political and regulatory process that creates competition instead of monopoly in the energy sector) in the Republic of Lithuania. This process was also delayed and was finally completed only a few years ago.



PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN UKRAINE


Will the EU demand the closure of Ukraine's nuclear power plants, such as the Ignalina NPP? The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine claims that Ukraine's nuclear power plants will continue to operate because the reactors used at them meet EU requirements:

Unlike the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania, which operated RBMK-1500 reactors (graphite-water channel-type reactors similar to those used at the Chernobyl NPP), all operating Ukrainian NPPs are equipped with VVER reactors (water-water power reactors), which have a fundamentally different design and a higher level of safety. Ukrainian NPPs operate VVER-440 and VVER-1000 power units, which are used in many European countries, in particular in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, and are characterized by a high level of safety and efficiency.

In addition, in order to improve safety, operational efficiency and fulfill Ukraine's international obligations, the Comprehensive (Consolidated) Safety Upgrade Program for Ukrainian NPPs (CCSUP) is carrying out comprehensive modernization of VVER power units at Ukrainian nuclear power plants. The program is being implemented at all operating VVER-1000 and VVER-440 power units in Ukraine.

It is aimed at modernizing and improving the safety of nuclear power plants under modern nuclear and radiation safety requirements and IAEA standards.

The National Energy and Climate Plan for the period up to 2030, which was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on June 25, 2024, forecasts that the share of nuclear generation will remain at about 56% in the total electricity production structure in Ukraine in 2050. The share of NPPs in the total capacity of power plants in Ukraine may increase to 17.4 GW by 2032. At the same time, as of 2024, this figure is 7.68 GW.



CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

What is in store for the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant? We addressed this question to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine and received a detailed answer.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine made the decision to permanently shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on March 29, 2000. And on December 15, 2000, in accordance with Ukraine's commitments to the international community, as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the Governments of the G7 countries and the European Commission on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Ukraine shut down the last operating unit No. 3.

According to the National Program for the Decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP and Transformation of the Shelter Object into an Environmentally Safe System, decommissioning is carried out in 4 stages:

- Decommissioning (preparatory stage for decommissioning, lasted from 2000 to 2015). The stage during which nuclear fuel is removed and transferred to a spent fuel storage facility intended for long-term storage.
- Final closure and conservation of reactor facilities (current stage, from 2015 to approximately 2028).
- Reactor facilities operation during the period when the natural decrease of radioactive radiation to an acceptable level should occur (approximately until 2045).
- Dismantling of reactor facilities. At this stage, the equipment will be dismantled and the site will be cleaned up to maximize the removal of restrictions and regulatory control (approximately until 2065).

Thus, as of today, ChNPP is at the stage of decommissioning and transformation of the Shelter into an environmentally safe system.

REFORMING THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY OF UKRAINE

- In the context of the European integration process, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine defines the main directions for further work in the energy sector:
- Implementation of the Green Deal and development of renewable energy and alternative fuels;
- implementation of energy strategies and policies, improvement of the statistical accounting system of the energy sector;
- creating effective mechanisms to address potential crises in the energy sector;
- modernization and strengthening of the existing energy infrastructure, gradual integration of Ukraine's electricity system into the European electricity network;
- development of competitive, transparent and non-discriminatory energy markets based on EU rules and standards;
- promoting energy efficiency and energy saving, improving the investment climate;
- cooperation within European and international standardization bodies in the energy sector.

YEVHEN DZHUMYGA



FULL VERSION VIA
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FOURTH REACTOR ON CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT


THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL REFORMS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Despite the war, political instability and survival challenges, Ukraine today faces perhaps the most important civilizational question in decades: are we truly ready to become a full-fledged part of the European Union - not only at the level of external rhetoric, but through the internal transformation of the legal system, judiciary and public administration. Justice has become one of the key markers of trust on the part of the EU, and its real renewal depends on whether Europe will open its doors to us in the coming years.

7 MAIN CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD OF LAW FOR UKRAINE

In June 2022, when granting Ukraine the status of candidate for EU membership, the European Commission identified seven key recommendations that must be implemented in order to open full-fledged accession negotiations. They cover the most critical areas where systemic transformation is expected. Here is the list:

- Reform of the Constitutional Court, with a transparent procedure for selecting judges;
- Ensuring the fair selection of members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ);



- Strengthening the fight against corruption, in particular through the effective functioning of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP);
- Combating money laundering, in accordance with FATF recommendations;
- Implementing an anti-oligarchic law, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission;
- Harmonizing media legislation with European standards;
- Guaranteeing the rights of national minorities, in accordance with the norms of the Council of Europe.

These conditions have become a clear political and legal signal: the path to the EU no longer lies through loud statements, but through concrete reforms and effective actions. That is why Ukraine's legal system has come to the center of attention as a decisive criterion for our readiness for membership.



**MAKSYM DZIS, FOUNDER AND CEO OF
THE LEGAL AID CENTER**



WHY INSTITUTIONS AND PLATFORMS FOR REFORM MEDIATION ARE IMPORTANT

Despite some progress in implementing the recommendations of the European Commission — in particular, the restoration of the work of the High Council of Justice, the formation of the HQCJ and the partial activation of anti-corruption institutions — the legal system of Ukraine still remains in a state of deep transformation. Some decisions are blocked due to political interests, others require a deeper understanding of European legal standards. In this process, the key role is played by the legal community of Ukraine — lawyers, scientists, judges, human rights activists, who are able not only to adapt legislation to the “*acquis communautaire*” (this is the name of the EU legal system, which includes acts of European Union legislation), but also to form a culture of legal responsibility and the rule of law in society.

In the context of the necessary acceleration of certain reforms and strengthening public demand for trust in the justice system, we plan to hold a forum in Kyiv in 2025 under the title “Ukraine on the threshold of the EU: is our legal system ready?”. We see the expediency of creating an open platform in Kyiv for honest conversation between representatives of the government, business, the legal community and international partners. The forum plans to discuss the real state of judicial reform, the progress of harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with EU law, the effectiveness of the anti-corruption infrastructure and jointly develop specific solutions that will bring Ukraine closer to full membership in the European Union.

MAKSYM DZIS



COURTROOM IN THE EUROPEAN COURT BUILDING.

IN SEARCH OF SILVER BULLET TO REBOOT UKRAINE'S ECONOMY

An Interview with Dovydas Vitkauskas' various consultant roles in Ukraine include a Team Leader of EU-funded governance and rule of law reform projects since 2016. He has also been acting as advisor to two consecutive administrations of the President of Ukraine.

The signing of the Mineral Deal was and is one of the main topics in bilateral Ukrainian-American relations. Can we already talk about specific points of the agreement and what are unconditional "red lines" for Ukraine?

I do not believe any of the two parties are taking the rare earths agreement as a serious practical endeavour. It is a matter of political PR. The risks related to the amount of additional investment required for extraction far outweigh any foreseeable financial benefit for both sides. But who would benefit from such a deal". But the proposed deal – however unrealistic in practice – will result in signatures being put on paper. And that means a very viable risk of prosecution – following a possible political change after the forthcoming elections – for members of the Ukrainian government who signed on a relinquishment of such national resources to foreigners. Former Prime Minister Iuliia Tymoshenko was imprisoned on far lighter charges just a decade ago. This is why it can be suspected that the Ukrainian government will be dragging their feet on the proposed deal. Even if it eventually succumbs to the American pressure, a signature will be put by a more minor member of the Ukrainian government... The only player who has a strategic willingness, patience and logic to do similar long-term projects in Ukraine is China. Just check what Chinese investors are currently doing in Afghanistan, where President Trump signed a very similar rare earths deal during his first presidency in 2017.



DOVYDAS VITKAUSKAS' VARIOUS CONSULTANT ROLES IN UKRAINE INCLUDE A TEAM LEADER OF EU-FUNDED GOVERNANCE AND RULE OF LAW REFORM PROJECTS SINCE 2016



Can this agreement in any version be considered a condition for further cooperation between Ukraine and the USA, including in the sense of receiving financial assistance, non-lethal and lethal weapons?



Tension between Trump, J.D. Vance, and the Ukrainian President at the White House ahead of the collapsed deal on Ukraine's mineral resources.

The new US government has very clearly indicated its strategic pivot to Asia, and gradual disengagement from Europe. This, together with the announced trade tariffs, will cause various problems of military and economic cooperation between the US and Europe as a whole. Ukraine will not be the only loser of such policy, in case it materialises.

What is Ukraine's position on including in the text of the agreement not only the issue of minerals, but also a list of infrastructure facilities. Even before the start of the great war in Ukraine, preparations were underway for the privatisation of ports. Can this practice be scaled up and will the "Minerals Agreement" not get in the way?

Unfortunately, Ukraine has very limited regulatory and administrative capacity to properly privatise a minor port worth USD 5 million. The history of independent Ukraine in the last 34 years has generally been a history of discouragement of foreign investment, to the benefit of local financial and political groups.

Can the country be realistically expected to manage much bigger and more complex infrastructure privatisation projects? Secondly, Ukraine currently has 13 seaports. This is a rather excessive figure for an economy worth only USD 160 billion in annual GDP.

What volume and type of goods will each of these ports carry within 10 years? Will Ukraine be a manufacturing powerhouse then, or remain largely a commodities producer – as a result, will infrastructure investment be needed more for container, bulk, other traffic? These strategic questions of any potential investor are still unanswered, some for the objective reasons of the war. The neighbouring Romania produces almost double GDP than Ukraine but has only 8 ports, including on the Danube delta. Ukraine needs to consolidate its logistics infrastructure, rather fragment it further by way of case-by-case privatisations. This means decommissioning some of the heritage ports with the Soviet era infrastructure. It will not be an easy task either politically, or economically.

Frozen Russian assets: under what conditions can they be transferred to Ukraine and what is the Ukrainian side's position on their possible use for the "reconstruction" of the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia? (I know your position on this issue, but it can be expanded with specific examples and the position of specific countries/or country speakers).

There has been a lot of confusion on the issue of "frozen Russian assets", where illusions and political manoeuvring – especially from Brussels bureaucrats – frequently outpaced the reality. First, Ukraine will not get any benefit from billions of dollars in sanctioned private Russian assets, except for "peanuts" in cases of criminal offences committed in the West by sanctioned oligarchs (see the Malofeyev case, for instance).

Second, contrary to the impression created by some EU officials, Ukraine is not getting a portion of sanctioned sovereign Russian assets, such as the holdings of the Russian Central Bank in Belgium. Ukraine will only get a part of the income (coupon) generated from these Russian investments. This means a couple of billion of USD per year, at best. Ukrainian government might possibly also get more guaranteed loans against the Russian sovereign holdings-linked collateral. But these will not be gifts but rather financial obligations on the Ukrainian taxpayer.

During 2024, Ukraine's total public debt increased by \$20.7 billion. But at the same time, in 2024, Ukraine's public debt was restructured. Is it possible to predict the dynamics of changes in public debt and how does it depend on US policy? What are the repayment terms of the loans that Ukraine took out during the war and is it possible to restructure them and/or repay them with frozen Russian assets?

Ukraine already owes more than its annual GDP, or USD 160 billion, to foreign investors. The figure will likely be 125% of GDP in public debt by the end of this year. Ukraine has also been in selective default to its creditors since 2022. Unfortunately, the no-strings-attached behaviour of EU and other donors is only exacerbating the position. Different types of maturity of Ukrainian government debt are now selling between 50 to 70 cents on the dollar, and might even decrease, if the market's early hopes for a ceasefire are fading. Having said that, the US policy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict can provide a significant boost to the market and thus the sustainability of Ukrainian public finances. But to what extent that US policy is realistic and productive – it is a much harder question to answer.

What are the possible ways to obtain funds for Ukraine: further loans, agreements with the transfer of part of the profit from the exploitation of natural resources, infrastructure facilities, concessions or large-scale privatisation?

Proper privatisation of all types of land, including allowing its foreign ownership. Land is the only hard resource of Ukraine which is of uncontested value. Most of the other assets discussed by the Ukrainian government and its Western Partners as tools to reboot the economy – including the State-owned companies or rare minerals – are essentially worthless, or inaccessible without billions of dollars in additional investment. Allowing full private land ownership is also a key psychological and society-building factor, if Ukraine truly wants to be part of the Western rules-based society. The current State control of land is a landmark of the Soviet past in Ukraine's political and legal systems and business culture, which have dragged Ukraine down for decades.

STANISLAV KINKA



UKRAINIAN AND U.S. DELEGATIONS DURING THE SIGNING OF THE MINERAL RESOURCES DEAL.

CANADA BY UKRAINE'S SIDE: A RELIABLE ALLY IN THE FIGHT, RECOVERY, AND BUILDING OF A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

Natalia Cmoch told in an interview for The Ukrainian Review that operation UNIFIER is a cornerstone of Canada's military support to Ukraine. Since its launch in 2015 — and its expansion following Russia's full-scale invasion — the mission has trained over 44,000 Ukrainian service members, including 10,000+ abroad, in vital domains such as tactical combat, field medicine, engineering, and officer leadership.

Canada is committed to adapting UNIFIER to meet evolving threats. We are expanding into cybersecurity, air defense support, and combat engineering, and continue our close coordination with NATO and the U.S. via SAG-U and NSATU. Following the February 2024 Canada-Ukraine Security Agreement, we're now looking beyond 2026 to transform Operation UNIFIER into a long-term strategic security partnership, advancing Ukraine's full Euro-Atlantic integration and defense resilience.

ON CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE BRINGKIDSBACK UA INITIATIVE

Canada has been a driving force behind the BringKidsBack UA initiative. As part of our commitment to the human dimension of peace, we work through diplomatic, legal, and humanitarian channels to return Ukrainian children who have been forcibly displaced or deported by Russia.

Over 1,200 children have now been safely returned, and Canada has committed CAD \$10 million to UNICEF for the "Family for Every Child and Pathways for Return and Reintegration" program — helping ensure safe returns, reintegration, and trauma-informed care. However, challenges persist: restricted humanitarian access in occupied areas, documentation gaps, and lack of Russian cooperation. That's why Canada supports Ukraine's efforts at the International Criminal Court, and continues to raise this issue at the UN, G7, and other global forums.

REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G7 EXTRAORDINARY REVENUE ACCELERATION (ERA) INITIATIVE FOR UKRAINE

Canada has pledged nearly \$5 billion CAD in financial support under the G7's Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) initiative, helping ensure Ukraine can maintain essential services and respond to wartime shocks.

These funds are disbursed via trusted international financial institutions, including the World Bank's PEACE mechanism, and are subject to strict oversight, transparency requirements, and performance benchmarks agreed upon with the Government of Ukraine.

Under Canada's 2025 G7 Presidency, we continue to work with our partners to mobilize immobilized Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. Accountability and transparency remain central to our approach — both in the use of funds and in ensuring Russia ultimately pays for the damage it has caused.

This year marks 10 years since the creation of the National Police of Ukraine (July 3, 2015). Could the Embassy of Canada announce what specific results and metrics of cooperation in police reform are key for you? In particular, to what extent have programs such as the Police Stabilization Project and cooperation within the Multinational Joint Commission contributed to the formation of modern patrol, cyber and special police units? Are new Canadian-Ukrainian programs planned for the reform of the Ukrainian police, in particular in the area of eradicating corruption?

Canadian Programs (GAC) – New Initiatives: Canada is currently in a post-election and pre-budget stage. Given the new budget has not yet been tabled, the government is operating under interim supply bills passed before the election or under previous fiscal frameworks. This limits the ability to launch new spending programs or adjust major fiscal priorities until Budget 2025 is formally introduced and passed. Once this occurs, Canada will be able to assess opportunities for new programming support to Ukraine.

Multinational Joint Commission: Nil from YRG; policy lead(s) to comment.

Police Stabilization Project: Global Affairs Canada has provided funding support for four back-to-back initiatives advancing police reform and capacity-building efforts in Ukraine totaling \$27 million, from 2015-2025. The most recent project, Police Stabilization Project (2023-2025) worked across several areas of cooperation, and achieved the following results, among others:

- Supported wartime policing through psychological resilience training and establishing community safety hubs in all oblasts;
- Helped prepare the deployment of 2000 school safety officers through the provision of resources and strategic advice;
- Enhanced gender-responsive policing and conflict-related sexual violence response capacity; and
- Expanded the Peer-to-Peer psychological support program with over 59,000 consultations to help police mental health during wartime.

CMPU: Through the CPMU, the RCMP and partners aim to transform the National Police of Ukraine into a modern, accountable and transparent police service 1 UNCLASSIFIED | NON CLASSIFIÉ founded on internationally recognized standards and best practices, which includes the respect for human rights.

The objectives of Canada's bilateral mission are to support Ukraine's police reform efforts by:

- building the capacity, effectiveness and sustainability of Ukraine's police services including developing specialized areas of expertise;
- increasing awareness of gender and human rights considerations and supporting gender-based violence response and investigations;
- implementing community policing model;
- improving internal accountability and oversight mechanisms.



NATALKA CMOC — AMBASSADOR
OF CANADA TO UKRAINE



Mark Carney's vision for military cooperation and a possible joint venture with Roshel Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a significant increase in military spending and a strategic course for partnerships with non-American defense companies. In particular, there is talk of a project for a joint Ukrainian Canadian enterprise with the Canadian Roshel for the production of armored vehicles (such as Senator, Bison, Coyote). Does the Embassy have any position or willingness to comment on this initiative – its format, expected production volumes and possible models of participation of Ukrainian companies? How promising does the creation of such joint Canadian-Ukrainian enterprises in the defense sector look in general?

Since February 2022, Canada has committed over \$6.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine. At the 2025 G7 Leaders' Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, Prime Minister Carney announced an additional \$2 billion in military assistance to Ukraine this year. Canada is committed to supporting Ukraine's defence industry, including strengthening its capacity to produce domestically developed or manufactured capabilities urgently needed on the frontlines. As part of this commitment, we 2 UNCLASSIFIED | NON CLASSIFIÉ continue to explore opportunities to strengthen relations between Ukrainian and Canadian industry, particularly through joint ventures that aim to deliver advanced technologies and equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Canada is currently leading the Drone Capability Coalition Joint Ventures Working Group, for example, and is seeking to enhance manufacturing of Ukrainian capabilities on Canadian soil, with the intent to advance both the production and capacity of these systems, in line with AFU requirements.

OLEKSANDR YAVTUSHENKO



DELIVERY OF AMBULANCES FROM CANADA TO UKRAINE

UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: WHAT ARE WE REALLY HEADING TOWARDS?

We constantly hear about European integration as Ukraine's unquestionable, strategic course. It sounds confident, persuasive, even uplifting. But do we truly understand what lies behind this path? What are the real conditions set by the European Union, and is Ukraine ready to meet them? In this article, we will break down every stage of Ukraine's accession to the EU, outline the key requirements, and analyze the pros and cons of the process — both for Ukraine and for Europe. This is an attempt to take an honest look at reality and understand the true cost and value of EU membership.

OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO (2028–2030)

This assumes rapid progress on both sides — Ukraine and the EU.

Assumptions:

- Ukraine implements reforms quickly: Ukraine efficiently aligns its laws, institutions, and governance with EU standards (especially in rule of law, anti-corruption, judiciary, and economic policy).
- EU demonstrates political will: The EU is accelerating Ukraine's accession for geopolitical reasons, especially due to the ongoing war with Russia and the desire to consolidate Ukraine in the Western bloc
- Minimal resistance from EU members: Member states don't block or delay the process over concerns about enlargement fatigue, budget contributions, or internal reforms.

WHY IT'S STILL "OPTIMISTIC":

- Normally, EU accession takes 10+ years; even countries like Poland or Romania took roughly that long post-application. Ukraine applying in 2022 and joining by 2028–2030 would be exceptionally fast.
- The EU may need to reform internally (especially its budget and voting procedures) to absorb such a large country as Ukraine.



VOLODYMYR SAVCHENKO,
CEO THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW



REALISTIC SCENARIO (2030–2032)

This is seen as more pragmatic and probable, assuming steady but slower progress.

Assumptions:

- Ukraine makes substantial but gradual reforms.
- Some EU countries push for internal reforms first or are wary of further enlargement without addressing concerns like budget redistribution or decision-making structures.
- Ongoing conflict or instability may slow Ukraine's reform path or EU integration focus.
- Public opinion in the EU may fluctuate, causing political delays (a dangerous trend is emerging in Poland, where more than 40% of respondents spoke out against Ukraine joining the EU and NATO).

WHY IT'S MORE LIKELY:

- It gives both Ukraine and the EU more time to prepare structurally and politically.
- It fits better with historical precedents — for example, Western Balkan countries have been in talks for years, even decades.

KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE EU

The EU's requirements go far beyond adopting formal laws — the real focus is on tangible impact in Ukrainian society. Brussels expects not only the adoption of directives, but also their effective enforcement in areas such as the judiciary, anti-corruption, human rights, environment, and the economy. These standards define not just legal compatibility but a shared value system between Ukraine and the European community.

Key requirements include:

- An independent and functioning judiciary.
- Robust anti-corruption framework (Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecution (SAP), National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP).
- Protection of human and minority rights.
- Reform of public administration and institutional transparency.
- A competitive, market-based economy.
- Agricultural compliance with CAP standards.
- Alignment with environmental policy (The European Green Deal).
- Financial and macroeconomic stability.



BENEFITS FOR UKRAINE FROM JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION:

- Access to the EU Single Market.

Ukrainian companies will gain the ability to freely export goods and services across EU member states, reaching over 500 million consumers. This opens up new business opportunities, boosts GDP, and supports the development of modern industries.

- Financial support and development funds.

EU membership provides access to structural funds, subsidies for modernizing infrastructure, agriculture, and education, as well as major investments in post-war reconstruction (certain programs are already in effect despite the war).

- Higher living standards.

EU legislation ensures social rights, worker protections, and equal access to healthcare and education. This leads to tangible improvements in the daily lives of Ukrainian citizens.

- Enhanced security and stability.

Membership strengthens Ukraine's international standing, fosters political integration, enables participation in shaping common EU security policy, and reinforces the country's Euro-Atlantic course.

BENEFITS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM UKRAINE'S ACCESSION:

Ukraine's integration into the European Union offers several strategic benefits for the EU, particularly in agricultural and defence policy areas.

- Expansion of strategic space.

Ukraine is the largest country in Europe by land area. Its accession would strengthen the EU's geopolitical position on the eastern flank and create a buffer against authoritarian regimes.

- A strong agricultural and industrial partner.

Ukraine is one of the world's leading producers of agricultural goods and metals. This will enhance the EU's food security and reduce dependency on imports from third countries. EU integration would secure a stable, internal source of grains, sunflower oil, and other agricultural commodities, reducing dependency on imports from volatile regions.

- Military and security expertise.

Ukraine brings unique combat experience in countering hybrid threats. Its involvement in shaping EU security policy would be a strategic asset for the entire Union. Ukraine has a historically strong defence manufacturing base (e.g., Antonov aircraft, tank and missile production); and closer integration would enable joint ventures and technology transfer between Ukrainian and EU defence industries.

- Moral revitalization of the EU.

Ukraine represents a powerful symbol of the fight for freedom, democracy, and human dignity, reminding Europe of the core values it was built upon.



CHALLENGES AND RISKS FOR UKRAINE:

Ukraine's path to EU membership is fraught with obstacles. Judicial and anti-corruption institutions remain fragile.

According to the survey, a few years before the full-scale Russian invasion, only 20% of court judgments were enforced, undermining the rule of law.

Additionally, war has devastated agriculture—destroying infrastructure, blocking exports, and occupying farmland—while compliance with EU standards will impose extra costs on producers. Finally, reconstruction demands exceed \$400 billion, straining Ukraine's fiscal capacity to fund reforms and meet EU criteria

Let's list the main risks that Ukraine faces:

- Intensified competition in the domestic market (Ukrainian businesses will face strong competition from established EU brands, especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services).
- High costs of aligning with EU standards (To meet EU requirements (technical, sanitary, environmental), both the state and private businesses will need to invest billions of euros in modernization).
- Increased migration outflow (Easier movement could accelerate emigration of young and skilled workers, worsening Ukraine's labor shortage).
- Restrictions in the agricultural sector (Strict EU farming regulations, quotas, and subsidy rules may disadvantage Ukrainian farmers).
- Partial loss of decision-making sovereignty (In key areas such as economy, energy, and environment, Ukraine will have to coordinate domestic policies with EU institutions, limiting its independent policymaking).

CHALLENGES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION:

The EU will face a range of economic, security, political and institutional challenges during Ukraine's integration process.

- Financial burden.

Ukraine's accession would require significant spending from the EU budget — for infrastructure, regional development, agriculture, and post-war reconstruction. According to some estimates, this could amount to tens of billions of euros annually.

- Agricultural market competition.

Ukraine is one of Europe's largest agricultural producers. Its entry poses risks for EU farmers — particularly in France, Poland, and Hungary — due to potential market oversaturation and competition for subsidies.

- Security and war at the EU's borders.

Integrating a country at war or bordering an aggressive Russia may increase security tensions and force the EU to rethink its common defense policy and long-term strategic priorities.

- Need for institutional reform in the EU.

Admitting a country as large as Ukraine would require a revision of EU decision-making rules, especially reforms to the unanimity principle that currently governs many areas.

- Political polarization within the EU.

Some member states — such as Hungary or Slovakia — have shown skepticism or caution toward rapid enlargement. This could deepen internal divisions within the Union (also posing a threat are various right-wing political parties that exploit the issue of migration and excessive contributions from EU member states to the EU).



Despite Ukraine's declared European integration as a strategic course, the country today faces not only the demands of the European Union but also a question of internal honesty: do we truly want to become part of Europe — not in words, but in action? The decision to join is not just about foreign diplomacy but, above all, about domestic political and moral transformation.

In Ukrainian society, the demand for European values is both real and profound. But is the political elite ready to fully commit to this path? The absence of key reforms in the judicial, anti-corruption, and law enforcement sectors raises serious questions. It often seems that part of the elite is deliberately slowing the process, knowing that genuine European integration would put an end to the schemes that have enriched oligarchs and clans for decades, built on the weakness of the state and the suffering of its citizens. However, this is a separate topic — one I intend to cover in a dedicated, in-depth article.

Therefore, we must be honest with ourselves: Ukraine's European future depends not only on the EU but also on the willingness of the Ukrainian state to dismantle corrupt systems, protect people's rights, and play by the rules. The key question is not "Will Europe accept us?" but rather "Are we ourselves ready to become a truly European state?"

P.S. ONE MORE CONCERN WORTH MENTIONING:

While EU membership offers undeniable opportunities, we must also acknowledge that accession in a post-war context could pose serious risks to Ukraine's economic sovereignty. With a weakened economy, damaged infrastructure, and a struggling small business sector, Ukraine may become vulnerable to rapid absorption by powerful Western corporations. Under the banner of "European integration," we could witness a wave of acquisitions — of land, industries, and key infrastructure — at deflated prices.

In such circumstances, it is crucial not only to join the EU but also to safeguard national interests. Ukraine must develop protective mechanisms to ensure it enters the Union not as a passive recipient of external influence, but as a modern, capable partner. Otherwise, if EU accession is treated by the political elite purely as a geopolitical symbol — and not a well-calculated economic strategy — Ukraine risks losing part of its sovereignty. And that is a conversation we must start now, not later.

VOLODYMYR SAVCHENKO





THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RIGHT TO BE PART OF EUROPE.
MAIDAN NEZALEZHNOСТИ, 2014.

THE EVILS OF EMPIRE

POLITICS



When we try to understand why Russia waged war against Ukraine, we often use categories that have nothing to do with the true motives of the aggressor. We talk about geopolitics, NATO expansion, resource competition, or the irrationality of dictatorship. But the truth is that Russia attacked Ukraine not out of fear, but out of hatred. Not because it was afraid of NATO, but because it could not accept the very fact of Ukraine's existence as an independent state.

Russia is not just a country with an authoritarian government. It is an empire that has never really gone through the process of decolonization. After the collapse of the USSR, it lost territory, but not its worldview. There has been no ideological shift in the Kremlin – just like a hundred years ago, they are convinced that Ukraine is a mistake of history. That the Ukrainian people are part of the “great Russian” people, and that Ukraine's independence is not a natural progression but a “geopolitical catastrophe.”



**VITALY PORTNIKOV, A WELL-KNOWN
UKRAINIAN JOURNALIST, POLITICAL
COMMENTATOR, AND AUTHOR**

In this sense, Putin is merely continuing the tradition of Russian rulers, from Catherine the Great to Stalin. But while for the Soviet leadership Ukraine was part of a union state, for Putin it is a matter of identity. Because if Ukraine exists as a democratic, independent, European country, the whole myth of the “Russian world” is destroyed. And Russia is not a civilizational center, but only a fragment of a colonial empire.

The war became inevitable when Ukraine finally refused to be part of the Russian project. When Ukrainians chose the European path, when they began to fight for freedom and dignity, when the Maidan became an inoculation against authoritarianism, Russia felt that it was losing not just influence but its ideological support. For as long as Ukraine is part of the Russian world, Russians can justify their slave “project.” But when Ukrainians live differently, it is a challenge more dangerous than any tank.

Russia is a state that cannot exist without war. Because only in war can it impose its model of behavior on society. This is a country that is based on fear, and for which peace is not stability, but a threat. It does not build the future, it reproduces the past. And that is why Ukraine, as a state that has broken out of this past, is an existential threat to it.

There is no “security logic” or “justice” to be found in this war. This is a war of hatred, a war of resentment, a war of imperial revenge. It did not begin in 2022 or even in 2014. It began when the first Ukrainians dared to say that they were not Russians. That their language, culture, memory, and dignity are not a variant of the Russian world, but an alternative to it.

That is why this war will not end with a compromise. Because a compromise between the aggressor and the victim is not peace, but defeat. History has shown this: Russia stops only when it is stopped. And if we really want to preserve Ukraine and a peaceful Europe, we need to talk about Russia not as a neighboring state, but as a threat. A constant, incorrigible, painful threat. Because Russia did not just attack Ukraine. It has finally recognized that it cannot live without Ukraine, and it cannot accept that we can do without it.

VITALY PORTNIKOV



AFTER PARAGRAPH 24: WHERE FOR THE UKRAINIAN REFUGEES?

Since the large-scale Russian attack in February 2022, more than one million Ukrainians have fled to Germany. It was one of the largest refugee movements in Europe since the Second World War. Unlike in previous crises, the European Union reacted quickly and cohesively to at least this aspect of the war: On March 4, 2022, the so-called Mass Influx Directive came into force, which was implemented in Germany through §24 of the Residence Act. This paragraph granted immediate protection to Ukrainian refugees – without a lengthy asylum procedure, with access to the labor market, social welfare, language courses and medical care. For many, this finally meant some stability in the midst of a shattered life.

According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, there were around 1.1 million Ukrainian refugees living in Germany at the end of 2024, around 850,000 of whom had protection status under Section 24. Many of them are women with children, elderly people or people with health problems. The §24 status has been extended several times – most recently until March 4, 2025. A further extension until March 2026 is currently being discussed politically, but it is already clear that this does not mean a permanent right to stay.



SERGEJ SUMLENNY,
GERMAN POLITICAL
SCIENTIST, FORMER
HEAD OF THE BÖLL
FOUNDATION IN
UKRAINE

Ukrainians must therefore look for alternatives in good time. The right of residence provides for transitions to other residence titles – for example by taking up employment, training or family ties. In practice, however, this change is often associated with bureaucratic hurdles, ambiguities and high requirements. For single parents or older people in particular, such a transition is almost impossible to achieve.

The Ukrainian government is monitoring developments closely. In several statements, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Reintegration, Germany was thanked for its willingness to take in refugees – but at the same time appealed not to end the protection status prematurely. In September 2024, a Ukrainian delegation in Berlin called for long-term prospects for refugees, especially for families with school-age children. President Zelenskyy himself spoke in the EU Parliament of Europe's “shared responsibility for those who have been uprooted by Putin's war”.

The reason for such a position is understandable. Ukraine is missing its citizens – and not just for purely fiscal or economic reasons. In the first months of the war, many women left the country with their children – a perfectly understandable decision. But now, in the fourth year of the war, many of these children are becoming more and more integrated in their new countries. The chance that they will return at some point becomes smaller with each passing month. For Ukraine, this means a postponed demographic catastrophe.

In Germany, the debate about Section 24 is increasingly part of a broader migration policy discussion. The Greens and parts of the SPD have consistently advocated a generous extension of protection status beyond 2026.



Integration has been successful – now we also need legal certainty, – said Filiz Polat (Greens), migration policy spokesperson for her parliamentary group. SPD interior politician Helge Lindh also spoke out in favor of "permanent residence prospects for well-integrated Ukrainians".

Parts of the FDP and the CDU/CSU take a different view. In spring 2025, CDU Secretary General Carsten Linnemann called for a "return strategy for Ukrainians as soon as the situation in the country allows". Interior Minister Nancy Faeser was also cautious: "The protection is intended to be temporary – everything else depends on the security situation in Ukraine". The CDU's position is not Ukraine-sceptical, but rather based on general scepticism towards socially subsidized migration movements. Since the German labor market – in contrast to the labor markets of neighboring Poland or the Netherlands – is rather hostile to immigrants, Ukrainians living in Germany are more often dependent on social assistance than Ukrainian refugees in other European countries. The complicated health insurance system also ends up having the effect that many parts of the population see themselves at a disadvantage compared to refugees. The conservative CDU can hardly ignore this sentiment.

However, an abrupt end to protection status would have far-reaching consequences. Although some refugees have returned to Ukraine since 2022, according to a survey by the Federal Institute for Population Research, around 44% of Ukrainians living in Germany want to stay for the long term. There are many reasons for this: children are now integrated into German schools and many speak the language. Housing conditions in Ukraine are often precarious – entire cities such as Mariupol, Bakhmut or parts of Kharkiv are still destroyed. There are also security risks, especially for men of military age. Families in particular are faced with the question of where to return. In many cases, they simply no longer have a home.

While women, children and older people make up the majority of refugees, tens of thousands of Ukrainian men are also living in Germany – despite the general ban on men of military age leaving the country. Many of them were allowed to leave legally, for example as fathers of three children, students, chronically ill people or through humanitarian exceptions. However, some also entered illegally via third countries.

The situation is particularly dramatic for this group: A return to Ukraine could mean immediate conscription – with no opportunity to prepare for a civilian life. Although statistically speaking, military service for most means serving far from the front line or even in a non-combatant role, the psychological perception of an inevitable call-up immediately upon return is one of the most widespread fears of the men, but also of their families.

At the same time, their situation in Germany is often uncertain, as they rarely have access to integration facilitation measures such as family reunification or language support. It is particularly difficult for them to obtain a regular residence permit.

In Poland, where over one million Ukrainians have also found protection, temporary protection status has already been extended until June 2026. The Polish government even announced its intention to create long-term residence opportunities for well-integrated refugees – for example, by facilitating labor migration. The Netherlands was also open to the idea: In January 2025, the parliament passed a regulation that grants Ukrainian refugees with jobs a three-year residence perspective – regardless of how the war develops. While Germany is still debating, other countries are creating facts.

The political future of Ukrainian refugees in Germany remains uncertain. Much depends on the migration policy of the new German government under Chancellor Merz. But much also depends on the Ukrainians themselves. Will a strong, coordinated diaspora with political weight – comparable to the Jewish or Turkish community, for example – emerge from this hitherto largely fragmented community?

SERGEJ SUMLENNY



PROTECTION “WITH AN EXPIRATION DATE”: WHAT AWAITS UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN 2026

At the end of 2024, about 5.2 million Ukrainian refugees were outside Ukraine. Most of them – 3.9 million – are in EU countries. In particular, 20% are in Germany and 18% in Poland”, – said Daryna Marchak, First Deputy Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine.

Ukrainian refugees have temporary protection in EU countries (this decision is mandatory for all EU member states). It gives the right to live in any EU country (except Denmark), work, receive housing and medical assistance. Children and adults can study and receive social assistance.

Currently, temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees in the EU has been extended until March 2026. At the same time, it is currently unknown whether the protection will be extended after March 4, 2026.

Policies regarding Ukrainians vary greatly from country to country. In Germany, the emphasis is on language and integration courses. In Poland, the benefits are lower, so Ukrainians have to look for work immediately, – notes Dariya Mykhailyshyna, a senior economist at the Center for Economic Strategy (CES).

She also notes that the number of people receiving benefits has decreased in all countries:

In Poland, it has almost halved, in the Czech Republic, by 44%, in Germany, by 9%. Other countries are reducing the level of social benefits and the number of people who can receive them, partly due to employment, partly due to economic restrictions.



**DARIYA MYKHAILYSHYNA, A
SENIOR ECONOMIST AT THE
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC
STRATEGY (CES)**



Jacob Kirkegaard, an expert at the Brussels branch of the German Marshall Fund for Trade, Economics and Business, in an interview with Radio Liberty, expressed sincere doubts that the EU will force Ukrainians to return home if the war in Ukraine is still ongoing when the directive expires. And political leaders of both the EU and the NATO Secretary General are convinced that it will not end soon.



Oleksandr Volkov, a member of the board of the “Society of Ukrainians in Switzerland”, also notes that as far as he sees from the situation in Switzerland, the cancellation of the status is not planned, but it is likely that it will not be extended after March 2026.



OLEKSANDR VOLKOV,
A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF
THE “SOCIETY OF UKRAINIANS
IN SWITZERLAND”

Vasyl Voskoboynyk, president of the All-Ukrainian Association of International Employment Companies, also expressed his opinion on the Espresso show that some EU countries are interested in Ukrainians staying in the EU and finding work:

Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic are interested in Ukrainians staying there. Because Ukrainians are not only dependents, they are primarily looking for work for themselves, they have children there who are studying and who can potentially become members of the societies of the countries where they are. And it is clear that it is better for these countries to attract Ukrainians than Syrians or residents of, for example, Asian countries.

Stanislav Zhelikhovskiy, Ph.D. in Political Science, an international expert, notes that the situation may change after the ceasefire:

If countries perceive the ceasefire as a full-fledged peace, an anti-migration policy is possible.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABOLITION OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE IN THE EU

Inna Dashyvets, a researcher of the Ukrainian cultural space, believes that if the EU does not extend temporary protection after 2026, it will create significant challenges for millions of Ukrainians:

They may lose their legal status, access to work, housing and social services. Although some will be able to stay thanks to work or study visas, the question of their future status remains open.

Oleksandr Volkov emphasizes that Europe is interested in keeping economically active migrants. While the future of those who still depend on social benefits remains a matter for discussion:



INNA DASHYVETS,
A RESEARCHER OF THE
UKRAINIAN CULTURAL SPACE



In this case, only those who have a permanent job, or at least are close relatives of someone who has such a job, will have a good chance of staying in Switzerland for a long time. Switzerland will encourage the return of Ukrainians to Ukraine with cash payments, which will be designed in such a way that those who agree to return immediately will receive more money. Those who wait until the last minute will get more.



DARYNA MARCHAK,
FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF
SOCIAL POLICY OF UKRAINE



According to her, quite a few unemployed Ukrainian refugees will still try to stay by applying for political asylum:

A lot will depend on the situation in Ukraine and the agreements between the governments of the countries. And finally, refugees who arrived in Switzerland at an advanced age, if they stay in Switzerland without a job, will doom themselves to a very low pension by Swiss standards. Simply because they will not accumulate enough pension capital.

The future of temporary protection for Ukrainians in the European Union after March 2026 remains an open question. Experts point to factors that may influence the decisions of EU countries: the duration of the war, the economic integration of refugees, and the political situation.

Overall, research shows that Ukrainian refugees have largely become an economic asset for host countries, generating more tax revenue than they spend on supporting them. This creates an incentive for European states to keep employed Ukrainians.

ANYA OSTYMCHUK

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UNBROKEN THREAD: HOW “YOU ARE IN UKRAINE” CONNECTS THE OCCUPIED WITH HOME

Under fire, under occupation or evacuated – during the war, Ukrainians are looking for answers to new challenges every day. Some are mastering first aid skills, others are learning to respond to cyber threats, and some are starting to speak Ukrainian for the first time, a language the enemy is trying to eradicate. In the most difficult conditions, people hold on to their connection with their homeland, their native language, true news, and culture. The demand for knowledge and access to reliable information have become the pillars that hold out even when everything around them is collapsing. And that is why initiatives are emerging to support this demand – in a meaningful, safe and caring way.

"Always remember: you are not forgotten. The Defense Forces are doing everything they can to make your home feel like home again." These are not only words of support, but also the entry point to the special website for residents of the temporarily occupied territories “You are in Ukraine” — tyvukraini.com. This is a service that, among other things, provides access to a free high-quality VPN and a secure browser. While the occupation authorities are blocking Ukrainian websites, erasing the language, and propagating fear, Ukrainians in the TOT are receiving tools to overcome the enemy's information blockade, stay safe, preserve their national identity, and keep in touch with their people.

The initiative is the result of cooperation between the Dovidka.info project of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security and the Yellow Ribbon resistance movement in the occupied territories. The “You are in Ukraine” service organically complements and develops the direction that the Dovidka.info team has been implementing for several years – to help Ukrainians be prepared for the challenges of war, take care of themselves and their families, and resist the occupiers in a non-violent way. After all, Dovidka.info itself was born out of a simple but extremely important idea: to gather proven safety, medical, and resistance advice in one place. Thus, Ukrainians have a guide for times of war and emergencies with proven and professional instructions.



MYKOLA BALABAN, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SECURITY OF UKRAINE



The “You in Ukraine” service was launched on October 1, 2024. Since then, it has been providing Ukrainians in the temporarily occupied territories with access to authentic Ukrainian news, security advice, cyber hygiene, and psychological support. It also teaches how to counter Russian propaganda and help the Defense Forces without risking their lives and health.

Since the launch of the platform, more than 1,000 people have applied for VPNs to use Ukrainian websites without interference. This is proof that despite the pressure and intimidation of the occupation authorities, people want to remain part of the Ukrainian community, know the truth, and keep in touch with their families and their country.

The algorithm for using the service is quite simple. To do this, you need to:


- go to the website at the link;
- fill out a short form to get a secure VPN and browser;
- wait for confirmation;
- get instructions on how to connect to a VPN and browser that will work in the TOT.

“Even in the eleventh year of occupation - in Donetsk, in Crimea, in Luhansk and in Simferopol – people continue to show non-violent resistance. This is happening in all the largest cities that are currently under Russia's illegal occupation,” – says a spokesperson for the Yellow Ribbon resistance movement.

It was after the launch of “You are in Ukraine” that users from the occupied territories began to send in testimonies about how difficult it was for them to read Ukrainian news, watch television, or access a trusted Ukrainian website, as Russia blocks access to them and restricts the operation of most VPN services.

This has once again forced developers to look for new tools, including digital ones, that will help residents of the TOT stay in the Ukrainian information space despite all the circumstances.

Recently, the project has launched free online Ukrainian language training with personal tutors and enhanced security measures to counter Russian linguistic violence. After all, Russia is pursuing a systematic and consistent policy of exterminating the Ukrainian language in the temporarily occupied territories.



The Russian authorities are removing Ukrainian from educational institutions, changing signs and plaques, returning old Soviet place names, removing Ukrainian books from libraries and schools, and importing Russian textbooks in their place by the millions. Teachers of Ukrainian language and literature are being forced to retrain to teach Russian.

In just two years of full-scale war, Russia has destroyed more than 200 Ukrainian libraries and burned nearly 200 million Ukrainian books in the territories it controls. Under such conditions, speaking Ukrainian becomes not only a challenge but also a marker of resistance, and people risk paying for this marker not only with their freedom but also with their lives. Nevertheless, Ukrainians under occupation cherish their native language, and many of them are learning it from scratch, as they undoubtedly believe that their future lies in a free Ukraine.

The training is designed to meet the real needs of people under threat. First, it is an individual approach: each participant receives a program adapted to his or her level of knowledge - from basic proficiency to conversational practice. Secondly, tutors work with both children and adults. The format is as flexible as possible: classes are held online and can be accessed from any device.

An important element of the practice is a live language environment – conversation clubs, thematic meetings and cultural sessions that help people feel part of the Ukrainian community, even if they are physically under occupation. More than 70 people from the occupied territories have already applied to study Ukrainian.

All classes are held in compliance with strict safety rules. Complete anonymity: no personal data of the participants is stored. For children, written consent from parents or guardians is required, and lessons with a tutor are conducted through encrypted communication channels.

The Ukrainian courses offered by the "You are in Ukraine" project are not just about knowledge. It is, above all, about support and solidarity. For students, it is an opportunity to improve their language skills and confidently pass entrance exams to Ukrainian universities. For adults, it is a way to break out of information isolation, get psychological relief and feel national unity.

Currently, the Dovidka.info team and Yellow Ribbon are working on launching the Crimean Tatar version of the "You are in Ukraine" website. After all, the occupiers are not only blocking access to Ukrainian information resources and destroying Ukrainian books, they are trying to erase the linguistic and cultural identity of the Crimean Tatars. And the Crimeans themselves do not see their future without Ukraine.

What is important about such initiatives is not only what they provide - a free VPN, language lessons, or security advice. What is important is what is behind them: a signal to people in the occupied territories that they are not alone, that they have not been forgotten, and that their connection with Ukraine cannot be broken, no matter how hard the enemy tries to do so.

If you have relatives or friends in the occupied Ukrainian territories, please share the link to the website "You are in Ukraine" – tyukraini.com.

MYKOLA BALABAN

FREEDOM SQUARE IN MARIUPOL BEFORE THE OCCUPATION





RESIDENT OF MELITOPOL TETIANA KUMOK AT A PRO-UKRAINIAN RALLY AGAINST THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION, 2022

THOUSANDS OF FLAGS INDICATE DEATH

Kyiv/Pokrovsk. The screech of tires. A massive SUV rumbles over the cracked asphalt. The road leads through a ghostly, empty city. The night paints the dilapidated high-rise buildings in a gloomy gray color. The engine of a car painted in camouflage colors howls. The driver accelerates to full throttle whenever the road allows. The tires screech on sharp curves. Four soldiers wearing helmets and protective vests squeeze into the seats, with jamming antennas bolted to the roof. They are designed to jam the radio waves that control Russian drones.

Death from a drone attack can come to Pokrovsk at any moment. For the Ukrainian soldiers defending the city. For the few remaining civilians. The burned cars on the roadsides also indicate the danger. There is no protection against drones, which are controlled through fiber optic cables. Yaroslav knows this all too well.

The wheels whiz over a railroad crossing. The men in the cab shake to the core. The car makes real jumps, then the headlights run along the concrete wall. After a few minutes, the car stops abruptly. The soldiers open the door, pull a massive drone out of the back and run it to the covered entrance of an abandoned apartment building. They do the same with a bundle of large batteries.

As soon as the last battery is taken out of the loading area and the door behind it is closed, the driver moves off. He quickly circles the building, the sound of the engine fading into the distance. Yaroslav (22), Anatoliy (44), and Dmytro (33) carry the drone and equipment into the building. They pass through a wall with hanging carpets to a shelter in the basement. A light bulb on the ceiling fills everything with dim light. Anatoliy, the male bear, lights the stove. The night shift begins.

Yaroslav disappears into the long basement of the block. It's pitch black, with only an LED flashlight providing light. The 22-year-old is preparing grenades for today's mission. A large transport drone is parked one floor up in the corridor of an abandoned apartment. It is equipped with a night vision device. Throughout the night, Yaroslav and his comrades will fly it to the fierce line of Ukrainian defenders, dropping food and coils of wire to them.



Till Mayer during his work on the Ukrainian front



The transport drone is prepared for deployment in the hallway of an abandoned apartment.

If the Russians try to move forward, we will throw grenades at them, – explains the young drone pilot.

Departure after the night shift: a drone attack could happen at any moment. Yaroslav and his two comrades run between the car and the house to stow the equipment in the car.

On his body armor, you can see a badge with the US flag in camouflage colors. Trump's so-called "peace initiative" is naturally a problem for soldiers. They have no right to express their political views in the presence of a journalist.



THE SEA OF FLAGS ON THE MAIDAN IS ONE OF THE SADDEST PLACES
IN KYIV.

As long as the Americans support us, I won't take off my badge either, – the soldier replies briefly. He does not trust Putin's Russia. – They are not interested in real peace.

There are good reasons for his distrust. In 1994, Russia received Ukraine's Soviet-era nuclear arsenal as part of the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, in turn, provided Ukraine with far-reaching security guarantees.

In 2014, Russian troops invaded Donbas and Crimea, – the young man recalls.


No one in the Ukrainian army respects Russian promises. On August 29, 2014, 366 soldiers were killed under heavy fire when they tried to use the corridor near Ilovaisk, promised by the Russians to escape. This is still etched in the memory of the soldiers on the front line. Only a day before the large-scale invasion, Putin denied any intention of allowing his troops to attack a neighboring country.

And today? Human rights organizations report systematic torture in the Russian-occupied territories, and thousands of people are missing. Anyone who refuses to accept Russian citizenship loses access to schools, universities, and hospitals. Even property is not spared. Children and youth are subjected to military drills in schools.

I am defending my country here, – says a young man who volunteered for the army in 2022, shortly after the invasion began. – Only if we are strong can we save our freedom and independence. Only then will Putin take us seriously.

He misses his girlfriend. You can see them both on the screen saver on his smartphone. A young, happy couple. He does not believe that they will soon be able to enjoy a stable and lasting peace. Then comes the order to deploy. Yaroslav switches his headlamp to red mode and together with Dmytro takes the prepared drone outside the house. A few hundred meters away, they hear the roar of an explosion from a collision. They are in a hurry. Their movements are perfect.

It is a rainy day. Nevertheless, Anastasia came to the Maidan today. It is one of the saddest places in Kyiv. It is a huge sea of flags and banners.



Anastasia mourns her father. One of the thousands of flags at the memorial site on the Maidan bears his name.



Departure after the night shift: a drone attack could happen at any moment. Jaroslav and his two comrades run between the car and the house to stow the equipment in the car.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, relatives stuck small Ukrainian flags into the green lawns at the edge of Independence Square. Each flag represented one or more of the dead.

In three years, a few flags turned into thousands and thousands. A sea of flags and banners in the Ukrainian colors of blue and yellow. Men in military uniforms look at passersby from framed photographs and behind glass – fallen soldiers.

My father died at the front on March 12, 2023. Then I stuck a small flag in the ground approximately in this place, – the 18-year-old girl points to the spot near the sidewalk. – Now the flags are so close to each other that Anastasiia can no longer recognize where her father's flag is.



YAROSLAV PREPARES THE DEADLY CARGO FOR THE DRONE MISSION.

But I know approximately. That's why I often come here to think about him, – she explains. – Peace would be great – but without the occupation. My father always warned me that Russia wants to destroy us, Ukrainians, as a nation. He volunteered as soon as the invasion began. I am proud of him. But I miss him very much. I'm not really interested in politics. But it is clear to me that we all have to be firm now. My father would say the same thing.

Anna (55) and Oksana (35) had just arrived when Anastasia left. The two of them walk up the subway stairs. On the last steps they see a sea of flags. Anna came from western Ukraine. She came to visit.

This is a terrible time. Especially since Trump became President of the United States. Every day, there is another bad news story because of him, – says the 55-year-old woman.

The sea of flags on the Maidan is one of the saddest places in Kyiv. Of course, she saw the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.



Women against the backdrop of the Sea of Flags on the Maidan

It was terrible. Trump's disrespect, – Anna shakes her head in frustration.

It was a shock for all of us in Ukraine, – Oksana agrees.

Some people are trying to take it with humor. Meanwhile, the most ridiculous stories about Zelenskyy's visit to Trump are circulating on social media. Elon Musk is walking around the Oval Office with a chainsaw. Zelenskyy shows a card trick.

Opposite him, US Vice President James David Vance spits out hundreds of playing cards.



The sea of flags on the Maidan is one of the saddest places in Kyiv.

However, both women are not in the mood for fun.

It's incredible how Trump is sucking up to Putin. Are the Americans even our partners? – Anna asks.

Now we can only hope for Europe, – Oksana is certain.

According to Anna, freezing the front will only give Russia the opportunity to continue arming itself unhindered.

Then there could be a much bigger war. Putin needs not only Ukraine, I just hope that the whole of Europe realizes this, – she explains.

We have two brothers in our neighborhood who died at the front, – Anna says. Then she turns around and points to the sea of flags.

All these brave people would have died in vain if there was peace, which is really a defeat, which does not give us any security, – Anna says. Oksana agrees.

Only really strong security guarantees and a united Europe will stop Putin, – she explains.

Then they both hurry out into the next downpour. The flags are left behind. Many of them read Pokrovsk, the front line where the soldier died.

TILL MAYER (PHOTO AND TEXT)



“PHOTO WITHOUT NAME”

THE RECONSTRUCTION GENERATION: WHO WILL REBUILD — AND WILL WE HAVE THE PEOPLE FOR IT?

When her city of Mykolaiv faced severe drinking water shortages at the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion, schoolgirl Liubov Slesarenko came forward with a unique innovation: a project for purification using a multi-stage hydrogel device powered by solar energy.

It is young people like her who will be called the generation of recovery — educated, driven, and resilient individuals who will rebuild Ukraine after Russia's destruction.



At global summits and forums, we often hear: Ukraine's reconstruction will be the largest recovery project of the 21st century. Will the country have human capacity to deliver on it? Will Ukraine have enough people like Liubov?

Already, Ukraine is experiencing a human capital crisis. According to the Center for Economic Strategy, one in seven Ukrainians was unemployed in 2023. Yet, job listing platforms are flooded with vacancies. This paradox, known as structural unemployment, when many people without work and many jobs without people. Today, businesses name it as their number one issue.

Although the situation has slightly improved in 2025 with a drop in unemployment to 12% — the lowest since the full-scale war began — the problem hasn't gone away. The challenge remains: upskilling takes time, and qualified workers are still being lost due to mobilization and emigration.

Could Ukraine face an even deeper human capital crisis once reconstruction efforts scale up? The answer is not hypothetical — it's grounded in hard data.

Together with the international research company Ipsos, we analyzed where teenagers see their professional futures and how that aligns with recovery needs. We based our analytics on RDNA4 — the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment jointly conducted by the Ukrainian government, World Bank, EU, and UN.



**KATERYNA OSADCHA, FOUNDER
OF KATERYNA OSADCHA
FOUNDATION**



According to RDNA4, Ukraine's recovery needs amount to \$524 billion. If this sum is secured, Ipsos modeling indicates that 1.5 million additional workers will be needed to implement the projects. Most of these jobs will be in construction, energy, mining, logistics and transportation, agriculture, trade, and processing. The biggest demand will be for electricians, welders, truck drivers, and mining industry workers.

But what do teenagers dream of becoming? According to the "Future Index" study initiated by the Olena Zelenska Foundation, most teens see themselves in IT, design, healthcare, beauty, education, or law and 7% envision themselves as entrepreneurs.

In some sectors, the gap between demand and aspiration is tenfold. For instance, energy needs an additional 12% of workers, yet only 1% of teens want to work there. Processing industries require 20% more labor, but only 2% of youth see themselves in manufacturing.

This trend signals a deepening of structural unemployment.

Yet identifying the problem early is half the solution — if followed by coordinated action.

Ukrainian businesses are already taking initiative. A competitive labor market has naturally increased real wages. Employers are actively recruiting women, students, and older workers into roles traditionally held by men. Veterans are being integrated more readily. And women are retraining for high-demand technical roles — in Vinnytsia, for example, women are now training to install solar panels.

Strategically, businesses are investing in future talents through partnerships with schools.

We follow a similar approach in our organization: offering free meetups with professionals, plant visits, and demo-days that let children have a head-on experience in their dream profession. This helps them determine whether their dreams hold up to real-world tests. After a visit to a sewing workshop — which he first brushed off as “a job for girls” — one boy is now setting his sights on a future in fashion design.



Demo-day for teens on sewing factory



Meeting for teenagers with different professionals



Demo-day for teens on sewing factory



Pottery master class for children deprived of parental care



Demo-day for teens in the restaurant

These tools work. But they aren't enough. A strategic challenge requires a strategic response.

First insight: Data shows many teens want to be entrepreneurs. That's a window of opportunity. We must popularize entrepreneurship in sectors critical for recovery.

Second insight: Career orientation should be an integral part of the recovery infrastructure. As we design reconstruction projects, we must also prepare the workforce that will bring them to life.

Third insight: We need modern, future-focused career guidance systems. The "Future Index" shows only 17% of teens took career tests, 4% visited job fairs, and 7% spoke with career counselors. For 74%, the only guidance came from parents. Why? Because current career orientation looks outdated and disconnected from youth needs.

Fourth insight: Career guidance cannot rest solely on schools or parents. We need a full ecosystem — aligning national priorities, market trends, educational tools, and family support. If a major state infrastructure project is to begin in 2027, businesses should know in 2025 to start preparing talent, logistics, and production chains. This requires open, long-term cooperation between the state, private sector, and civil society.

Fifth insight: Reconstruction jobs, especially blue-collar ones, must be made fashionable. That means destigmatizing manual labor and breaking stereotypes.

But first and foremost, we must understand: recovery is not about cement, bricks, or construction machinery. It begins long before cranes appear on the streets.

Recovery starts with a teenager in 11th grade choosing to become an architect, a civil engineer, or an energy specialist — so that in a few years, they can design housing for displaced families, rebuild shattered city blocks, or modernize the country's energy system.

KATERYNA OSADCHA

OK

ФУНДАЦІЯ
КАТЕРИНИ
ОСАДЧОЇ



CHANGES IN THE MOODS OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukrainian society has demonstrated impressive resilience, solidarity, and the ability to adapt to new challenges. During 2022–2025, significant transformations in the mood of citizens occurred, caused by both events on the front and internal socio-economic changes. This interview with Serhii Dembitskyi, Deputy Director for Scientific Work of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, is an attempt to analyze the phenomenon of Ukrainian resilience. We will try to investigate the dynamics of public sentiment during the war, revealing the key factors that influenced changes in the consciousness and behavior of citizens.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, we saw queues at military registration and enlistment offices, the desire of many people to go defend their state, engage in volunteer activities, and be involved in helping the army. Has the situation changed significantly as of today? How does sociology explain these changes? What factors have the greatest influence: fear, disappointment, fatigue, information and psychological operations of the enemy?

The changes in public opinion in Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in 2022 were somewhat paradoxical. Despite the fact that the beginning of the invasion was the most difficult period of this war for the Ukrainian state, the assessments of Ukrainians on socio-political issues changed dramatically for the better. This concerned many aspects – assessments of the state of the economy, attitude towards the state leadership, the importance of the democratic vector of the country's development, etc.

One popular hypothesis explaining this change is the “rally ‘round the flag effect,” which describes the consolidation of the population around political leaders and central authorities in the face of defining crises, which undoubtedly include full-scale war. If we accept this explanation, then the “rally ‘round the flag” phenomenon manifested itself for the second time in early 2025, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy entered into a public dispute with US President Donald Trump in the White House. After that, as in 2022, a number of socio-political assessments of the population went up sharply. At the same time, many other aspects of public life remained significantly different from the social processes that we observed at the beginning of a large-scale invasion.



SERHII DEMBITSKYI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENTIFIC WORK OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE NAS OF UKRAINE


The Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine has its own methodological developments suitable for tracking the state of public opinion in general, including the “GSR-5” scale (authored by Doctor of Sociological Sciences Serhiy Dembitsky), one of the purposes of which is to determine the general background of public opinion in the country. Its development began with the need to record the general level of positivity and negativity that characterize public opinion in a specific period of time. From an academic point of view, this need is due to the hypothesis of the existence of a general background of public opinion, in the context of which the remaining more specific issues of general public life will be assessed. The more negative the background of public opinion, the more respondents will gravitate towards negative assessments, and vice versa.

The “GSR-5” scale was developed in 2020, and since 2021 it has been included in the annual sociological monitoring “Ukrainian Society”, which has been conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine since 1994. The results of 2021 demonstrated a pronounced socio-political negativism that characterized public opinion, and the next measurement in May 2022 (the data was collected free of charge for the Institute by the Sociological Group “Rating”) recorded cardinal changes for the better. The latter is fully consistent with the hypothesis of the “rallying around the flag” effect.

In the following, we consider the specific results of the application of the “GSR-5” scale over the past four years, which will allow the reader to form their own idea of changes in public opinion in the conditions of a grueling war.


Indicators for individual questions of the methodology. The “GSR-5” scale consists of five questions and summarizes the answers to them. These questions include an assessment of the activities of central authorities, views on the future of Ukraine, an assessment of living conditions for the majority of the population, a correlation between Ukraine's achievements and failures since independence, and satisfaction with events in the country. Based on the results of the answers to all questions, a conclusion is made about the attitudes of the respondents - from clearly negative to clearly positive.

"HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AT THIS STAGE?" (%)



On the eve of the full-scale invasion, negative and intermediate views dominated among the assessments of the effectiveness of central authorities. And already in the first half of 2022, the absolute majority of the population assessed the authorities positively. At the same time, those who gave negative assessments were less than 4%! Subsequently, there was a gradual deterioration in the assessments up to and including 2024. In May 2025, they turned out to be slightly better than the previous year, but no fundamental changes occurred.


WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE?" (%)



The most significant factor in positive changes was the social optimism of Ukrainians, which in 2021 was characteristic of only 13.2% of the population. Negative and intermediate assessments again occupied a key place. Throughout 2022, optimistic views were characteristic of three quarters of the population. Despite the weakening of optimism in 2023, it was still shared by a significant number of Ukrainians – two thirds. And although in mid-2024 we recorded a significant “dilution” of optimism by negative and intermediate assessments, as of May 2025 it again became decisive for almost half of the population.

Paradoxically at first glance, during the devastating war, assessments of living conditions for the majority of the country's population also improved. If in 2021 the absolute majority considered them generally bad, then in 2022 and 2023 they were generally satisfactory. The orientation towards negative assessments in this question returned starting in 2024, although to a slightly lesser extent than in 2021.

"WHAT WOULD YOU SAY ABOUT THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF UKRAINE, STARTING FROM 1991 AND UP TO THE PRESENT DAY?" (%)



The most stable, given the responses received, was the question about the ratio of achievements and failures of independent Ukraine. The relative majority of responses in all measurements received the answer option according to which failures and achievements compensated for each other. To a somewhat lesser extent, respondents believed that failures prevailed. Positive or uncertain answers were recorded even less. It is significant that the number of uncertain answers increased in 2024 and 2025.

Finally, the most negative assessments in all measurements were recorded for the question of satisfaction with events in the state. But even here in 2022, a certain improvement in the answers can be observed. Just as with the question of the failures and achievements of the Ukrainian state, in this case we see a certain stability in the results. However, this stability is somewhat offset by the increase in negative assessments in 2024.

All the presented changes can be explained by the events, decisions and circumstances that Ukrainian society has encountered over the past 4 years. But I refrain from interpretations and suggest that readers formulate their own explanations. This will be a good exercise for the sociological imagination.

General attitudes. In addition to the presented data, the general attitudes of the population regarding the functioning of the state are given below (these attitudes should not be confused with assessments of the value of one's own state as such – they differed significantly in 2024). They are determined for each respondent based on the results of answers to individual questions of the scale and demonstrate his contribution to the general background of public opinion – negative, intermediate or positive. As of the end of 2021, a significantly negative background of public opinion was observed. Two-thirds of all respondents demonstrated either clearly negative or moderately negative attitudes. The war destroyed this dominant negativism, demonstrating to Ukrainians that even in such difficult circumstances, the Ukrainian state continues to function and rebuild itself in accordance with new challenges.

As of May 2022, negative attitudes decreased by more than 3 times, and positive ones increased by 6 times. Thanks to these significant changes, in 2022, positive assessments prevailed, and the number of intermediate ones exceeded the number of negative ones. In 2023, respondents who gave positive assessments were already a minority, and the number of intermediate and negative assessments almost equalized. And already in 2024, respondents with negative assessments were the absolute majority. It is significant that the distribution became almost identical to that at the end of 2021. Thus, in 2024, from the point of view of the general background of public opinion, Ukrainian society returned to its “usual” state less than 3 years after the start of the large-scale invasion.

Finally, it is time to return to the effect of “rallying around the flag”, which was repeated in 2025. As you can see from the last graph, it had a positive, but limited effect. First, the number of positive attitudes has almost tripled compared to 2024. Second, in the negative spectrum of assessments, moderately negative attitudes began to prevail over clearly negative ones. It is obvious that these changes occurred due to a significant increase in the social optimism of Ukrainians. The reason that led to this can be considered the beginning of the diplomatic process, which is designed to end the war. However, you can give alternative explanations for the recent changes.

STANISLAV KINKA



FULL VERSION VIA
THIS QR CODE

UKRAINE BELONGS IN EUROPE: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF OUR AFFILIATION

“Ukraine is Europe!” This slogan, familiar to everyone since the autumn of 2013, often clashes with our everyday experience. Phrases like “Let’s go to Europe” or “In Europe” suggest that Europe – and being European – is something separate from Ukraine and being Ukrainian. Why is it that, on the level of official declarations about our political and economic aspirations, we are part of Europe, yet in daily life Europe seems to begin somewhere beyond Ukraine’s borders?

The roots of this contradiction lie in our recent past – particularly the 20th century – when Ukraine, its space, and its statehood were denied their rightful place in Europe due to a mix of historical, political, and ideological factors.

But how did it happen that a territory geographically, culturally, and historically part of Europe came to be viewed as outside of it in the last century? After all, Ukraine’s historical development began similarly to that of many other European countries and peoples.

The contrast between Europe and other parts of the world can be traced back to ancient Greece. The Greeks divided the known world into three parts: Europe, Asia, and Africa. In their descriptions of various peoples, they assigned them to these regions. It was during this time that the lands of modern-day Ukraine first appeared in written sources. In his *Histories*, Herodotus described the Scythians arriving from Asia and conquering the land of the Cimmerians. These early accounts linked the territory of Ukraine with both place names and migrating tribes from Asia, embedding this association in ancient written tradition.

Despite being relatively close to Byzantium, the lands north of the Black Sea attracted little interest from Constantinople’s scholars. Only in the mid-10th century did Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus begin to take notice, as a new power – the Rus – emerged from the north, threatening the empire’s northern frontier.

These Scandinavians, known as the Rus, settled in the middle Dnieper region and, by the 10th century, had transformed their trade outposts (emporiums) into the first medieval state on the territory of Ukraine. Its origins were distinctly European.



VITALIY
MYKHAYLOVSKIY,
HISTORIAN



In the centuries that followed, the history of this state – commonly known as Kievan Rus – mirrored developments in many parts of Europe. Though Prince Volodymyr adopted Christianity from Byzantium, he also maintained close ties with his Western neighbors and communicated with Western Christian missionaries.




However, after his death, the principle of dividing inheritance among all male heirs fragmented the state into smaller competing principalities, each vying for control of Kyiv. The games of thrones in Rus were as complex and dynamic as those in England or France at the time, and ruling families in Rus maintained numerous connections with other European dynasties through marriage.

In the late Middle Ages and early modern era, much of Ukrainian territory came under the control of European monarchies. This led to the development of several fundamental features that shaped Ukrainian society – and still resonate today. Chief among them was the integration into the European legal space. Law, as a cornerstone of governance, distinguished the Ukrainian lands from the Muscovite state beginning in the mid-17th century, especially in Left-Bank Ukraine.

A second key feature was the existence and functioning of courts, where legal norms – based on diverse legal traditions – were used to resolve disputes across all social strata. These institutions ensured that the rule of law was more than just theory.

The third crucial feature was electivity. Despite class limitations, a culture of choosing one's leaders took hold. Many positions of authority, including that of the king, were filled through election. This tradition continued in the Hetmanate from the mid-17th century, where the election of leaders remained a core principle of governance.

There is much more that could be said about the European character of Ukrainian history. But even focusing solely on the legal dimension and traditions of governance makes one thing clear: Ukraine belongs in Europe.



MONUMENT TO ANNA OF KYIV,
QUEEN OF FRANCE AND DAUGHTER OF
YAROSLAV THE WISE

THE OLES HONCHAR FOUNDATION: JOIN THE GLOBAL MISSION TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S HERITAGE

HISTORY

Founded by the decree of the President of Ukraine in 1996, the Oles Honchar Foundation is one of Ukraine's most respected institutions for cultural preservation. It was established at the initiative of leading Ukrainian scholars, artists, and civic figures.

Its first chairman, academician Petro Tronko, was a renowned cultural architect and co-founder of the National Museum of Folk Architecture in Pyrohiv. He was succeeded by prominent leaders such as Roland Franko, diplomat and grandson of Ivan Franko, and Stanislav Arzhevitin, a historian, banker, and politician. All left a lasting legacy in the protection of Ukraine's spiritual and historical heritage.

Over three decades, the Foundation restored over 50 major sites, including St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery, the Dormition Cathedral of Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, the Church of the Nativity in Kyiv, the "Golden Rose" Synagogue in Lviv, the rock fortress of Tustan, Poltava's Assumption Cathedral, and the Mgarsky Monastery iconostasis — in total, 56 architectural monuments across Ukraine.

In 2025, a new chapter began as the Foundation appointed Vitaliy Romanchukevych — a well-known banker, civic leader, scholar, and philanthropist — as its chairman. His arrival marked a shift toward a postwar recovery agenda. Targeted restoration programs are being prepared to rebuild destroyed churches, museums, and memorials. Key priorities include partnerships with international foundations, diaspora communities, and volunteers worldwide. A digital registry of damaged heritage sites has also been launched — not just to track buildings, but to preserve memory itself.



VITALIY ROMANCHUKEVYCH — A WELL-KNOWN BANKER, CIVIC LEADER, SCHOLAR, AND PHILANTHROPIST

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF
FOLK ARCHITECTURE IN PYROHIV

Following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, which targeted Ukraine's cultural identity, the Foundation became a key actor in documenting losses and preparing for long-term reconstruction.

In early 2025, Romanchukevych's family donated five new bells to the Church of St. Nicholas in Dolyna, symbolizing grassroots cultural renewal.

To expand this mission globally, the Foundation invites individuals to become official international ambassadors. Ambassadors represent the Foundation abroad, help build partnerships with museums, donors, NGOs, and the media, and raise awareness of Ukraine's heritage struggle. Each volunteer receives official recognition and collaborates directly with the Foundation's leadership.

To become an ambassador of the foundation, simply write to Vitaliy and he will respond to you personally:

head@honcharfund.org.ua

+380 (67) 000 19 96

Ukraine's heritage needs defenders. Become one.



From left to right: Vitaliy Romanchukevych and the Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epifaniy of Kyiv and All Ukraine



From left to right: Stanislav Arzhevitin, Viktor Yushchenko (3rd President of Ukraine), Vitaliy Romanchukevych



IT IS DIFFICULT TO PICTURE RUSSIA WITHOUT UKRAINE: WESTERN MEDIA ABOUT INDEPENDENCE

34 years ago, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic adopted one of the most important documents in the history of the Ukrainian state – the Act of Independence of Ukraine. Although the declaration of Ukraine's independence was not the hottest topic in the foreign media in August 1991 (the attempted coup by conservative Soviet officials against the reformer and leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, was more actively covered), they could not ignore it. Let's take a deeper look into how foreign media viewed the independence of Ukraine.

GUARDIAN

On 24 August, the British newspaper Guardian did not have time to publish the news about the Act of Independence, but noted that the leaders of the second most powerful Soviet republic seemed to be moving cautiously but inexorably towards separation. Already on 26 August, the Guardian emphasised the importance of the Declaration of Independence for the continued existence of the USSR:

With a population and size similar to France, Ukraine is by far the most important republic after Russia. Breadbasket and industrial centre, its secession would be the biggest blow to the union...It is difficult to picture Russia without Ukraine.

One of the four foreign correspondents who were in Kyiv at the time of the Ukrainian declaration of independence was Guardian journalist Marta Dyczok. She described in detail her emotions during the vote for the Act of Independence of Ukraine:

When it became apparent, clear that it had been passed by a huge, huge majority, that feeling was something extraordinary again. This huge chamber was full of Parliament members, the diplomatic corps, the press, and guests. Everyone just rose up on their feet for this huge standing ovation that went on and on... Then somebody started singing the Ukrainian national anthem. And that was the first time it was sung in Parliament. Everyone has just joined in. It was somebody from the democrats from the floor of the house, as everybody was standing clapping suddenly.

AVUI

Dumenge,
25 d'agost
de 1991

Preu: 170 pess.

Fundada i editada per Miquel Folch i Torres
Directors: Miquel Folch i Torres

AVUI: 170 PESS. DUMENGE, 25 D'AGOST DE 1991. PREU: 170 PESS. FUNDADA I EDITADA PER MIQUEL FOLCH I TORRES. DIRECTORS: MIQUEL FOLCH I TORRES. DISTRIBUCIÓ: 170 PESS. DUMENGE, 25 D'AGOST DE 1991.

L'home de la 'perestroika' plega de secretari general del PCUS i proposa que es dissolgui


Gorbatxov desfà el PCUS

El president soviètic elimina el partit de les institucions

La Unió de Repúbliques Socialistes Soviètiques (URSS) es transforma en una federació de repúbliques. Cada una d'aquestes repúbliques té el seu propi govern i el seu propi parlament. El PCUS, el partit únic, es transforma en un dels molts partits que podran participar en el govern. El president soviètic, M. Gorbatxov, proposa que es dissolgui el PCUS i que es creï una nova Unió de Repúbliques Socialistes Soviètiques. Aquesta nova Unió estaria formada per 15 repúbliques i per la Unió de Repúbliques Autònoms. Cada una d'aquestes repúbliques tindria el seu propi govern i el seu propi parlament. El PCUS, el partit únic, es transformaria en un dels molts partits que podrien participar en el govern. El president soviètic, M. Gorbatxov, proposa que es dissolgui el PCUS i que es creï una nova Unió de Repúbliques Socialistes Soviètiques.

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Conféncia premsalera de M. Gorbatxov després de l'URSS.

diumenge

For a la cultura i la vida dels lectors

La Unió de Repúbliques Socialistes Soviètiques (URSS) es transforma en una federació de repúbliques. Cada una d'aquestes repúbliques té el seu propi govern i el seu propi parlament. El PCUS, el partit únic, es transforma en un dels molts partits que podran participar en el govern. El president soviètic, M. Gorbatxov, proposa que es dissolgui el PCUS i que es creï una nova Unió de Repúbliques Socialistes Soviètiques.

Juste Ucranà, l'home del cor càlid

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El vell i el nou en un terreny ple de vida

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Després d'un any de negociacions, la Unió de Repúbliques Socialistes Soviètiques (URSS) es transforma en una federació de repúbliques.

La proclamació d'independència d'Ucraïna trenca la Unió

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Ucraïnesos celebrant la independència d'Ucraïna.

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FINANCIAL TIMES

On 27 August 1991, the British newspaper Financial Times published a short article about Ukraine's declaration of independence, "Ukraine takes independence plunge". It emphasised that the new country of 53 million people 'could be a major force in Eastern Europe'.

The article described the new challenges that Ukrainian politicians would face.

If they are to achieve the independence they have declared, Ukrainian politicians will need to resolve various prickly issues. These include peaceful disposal of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine; division of all Union debt as well as reserves of hard currency, gold and diamonds; plus protection of the 11 million Russians living in the Ukraine.

LIBÉRATION

In early September 1991, the French newspaper Libération published several articles about the events in Ukraine and the declaration of its independence. One of them was devoted to a meeting between the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Leonid Kravchuk, and a group of foreign journalists, where they announced the possibility of forming a confederation of former Soviet republics.

Another article with the loud title 'In Kyiv, the Communist Party is in agony' reported on the banning of the Communist Party in Ukraine after a failed coup attempt. However, lacking a correspondent in Ukraine, the French newspaper had to illustrate its article on Ukraine's independence with a photo from a meeting held in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan.

L'UKRAINE A ADOPTÉ SAMEDI UNE RESOLUTION



Une barricade près du parlement de Riga en Lettonie est couverte de graffiti antikomunistes enjoignant les militaires russes à quitter le pays.

L'Union dans tous ses Etats

La Russie a reconnu, samedi, l'indépendance de l'Estonie et de la Lettonie, les douze pays de la CEE doivent décider, demain à La Haye, le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques avec les Etats baltes. De leur côté, l'Ukraine et la Biélorussie ont proclamé leur indépendance, elles doivent être suivies par la Moldavie.

Moscou, de notre correspondant
Sur le grand écran de Riga, Vladimir Ilitch est dépeint plus d'un demi-siècle l'Union soviétique, de la capitale latvienne, pendant qu'il parlait en occasion que arriva de la droite et la gravité de son discours. Le motif de Lettonie avait disparu, les images, relâché dans le noir, ont été de la nationalité. Le motif est à son retour à celle de l'Union, le dernier État soviétique. Et il se voit pas seulement des couleurs qui tombent, en quelques heures, de l'Union de coup d'Etat à Moscou, les pays Baltes ont été plus près de « libération » qu'ils n'ont jamais été pendant plus de deux ans. Depuis le 11 mars 1991, quand la Lettonie proclama son retour à l'indépendance, pendant de 1940 le pays avait été le 17^e anniversaire du pacte Molotov-Rib-

bentrop qui scella l'annexion des pays Baltes par l'URSS, le jour avait été annoncé, diffusé, et, malgré le non-assurance manifeste à leur égard par George Bush au moment de sa rencontre avec Mikhaïl Gorbatchev à Moscou, le conseil constitutionnel soviétique indépendantiste balte avait été élu plus tôt, pour se voir des données de reconnaissance, la première doctrine soviétique avait été qu'il est l'Union par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev.
 « L'histoire nous donne aujourd'hui raison, nous les pays scandinaves, nous les nations européennes, nous les relations diplomatiques avec nous, et nous espérons que nous ne soyons plus, parce qu'il a fallu se sentir étonnés pour qu'il se réveille », commentent les uns, tandis commentent les autres Vyacheslav Lashchergis, ancien ministre au parlement de Vilnius. Et il

offre le « droit » de spéculer sur une rupture des relations des Affaires étrangères de la CEE depuis l'adoption de son statut à La Haye, de rétablissement des relations diplomatiques avec les Etats baltes — par simple formalité, d'urgence, puisque les pays scandinaves n'ont jamais reconnu l'annexion de 1940.
L'Islande reconnaît les Baltes
 De longue date, les diplomates du Royaume ont tenté et tentent sans succès à Reykjavik pour signer un accord sur le rétablissement des relations officielles avec l'Islande et son voisin, le Danemark et le Norvège (appartenant lui, à l'union européenne, avec par le Grönland-Ferret et l'Islande, et le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a parlé d'un lien de parenté que le chancelier Helmut Kohl

avait même, vendredi dernier, qu'il était attendu.
 « La proposition du ministre allemand de leur accorder le statut de « membres associés » à la CEE doit cependant considérer leur avec une vision amère dans les pays baltes : « Il nous paraît évident comme nous le pensent Etats africains, non comme une composition traditionnelle de la réalité européenne », nous dit un haut fonctionnaire, « nous devons avec Hans Løkke, ministre en chef de principal subordonnés d'informations à Tallinn, capitale de l'Estonie.
 Sur ce plan-là aussi, Boris Eltsine a travaillé les Occidentaux en attendant, son après le coup d'Etat, que la Russie reconnaît l'indépendance de l'Estonie et de la Lettonie. Devant une ferme russe sur les procédés, le Quai d'Orsay devait être alerté « rapidement » que « la France a toujours

considéré l'annexion de la Lettonie une annexion illégitime ».
Une fenêtre se lève
 C'est de mieux que la seule forme de soutien européen pour la reconnaissance de l'indépendance, l'indépendance, et non plus une simple politique état à état, à la fin d'un, les pays baltes ont été plus près de leur indépendance, la Lettonie se prépare à Moscou à la CEE, mais en même temps, les relations diplomatiques avec elle ont été rompues. Et il se voit pas seulement des couleurs qui tombent, en quelques heures, de l'Union de coup d'Etat à Moscou, les pays Baltes ont été plus près de « libération » qu'ils n'ont jamais été pendant plus de deux ans. Depuis le 11 mars 1991, quand la Lettonie proclama son retour à l'indépendance, pendant de 1940 le pays avait été le 17^e anniversaire du pacte Molotov-Rib-

WASHINGTON POST

On 24 August 1991, the daily American newspaper Washington Post described Ukraine as the most important Soviet republic after Russia and stated that its declaration of independence was “taking the Soviet Union one step nearer to breakup”.

The decision struck the most serious blow yet to plans for the preservation of the Soviet Union under a new union treaty. Unlike the Baltic republics, which also have declared their independence, the Ukraine is regarded by many Russians as part of a Slavic homeland. The Ukraine, with 21 percent of the Soviet population, provides the nation with 25 percent of its food and coal and accounts for 21 percent of its industrial output.

THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY

It was no surprise that The Ukrainian Weekly, the leading newspaper of the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States, devoted the most attention to Ukraine’s declaration of independence. Its front page featured an article titled Ukraine Declares Independence alongside a striking photo of a massive blue-and-yellow Ukrainian flag flying outside the Ukrainian Parliament on the day independence was proclaimed.

More than half of the newspaper’s pages were dedicated to the topic of independence and the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, with headlines such as “Independence: Bye-Bye, USSR,” “Poor George, Poor Mikhail!”, and “What the Act Means for Ukraine.”

One of the featured articles, titled Storm Clouds on the Horizon: The Demise of the Ukrainian SSR, was written by James Mace — an American historian, political scientist, and one of the first scholars to study the 1932–1933 Holodomor. He wrote:

This might seem the realization of the hopes and dreams of all whom the bonds of ancestry and affection hold to this land, so generously endowed by God and beknighted by history. It is, however, only a beginning, and the storm clouds are already peeking over the horizon.

YEVHEN DZHUMYGA

ПРОГОЛОШЕННЯ НЕЗАЛЕЖНОСТІ УКРАЇНИ

Виходячи із смертельної небезпеки, яка нависла була над Україною в зв'язку з державним переворотом в СРСР 19 серпня 1991 року,

- продовжуючи тисячолітню традицію державотворення в Україні,

- виходячи з права на самовизначення, передбаченого Статутом ООН та іншими міжнародно-правовими документами,

- здійснюючи Декларацію про державний суверенітет України, Верховна Рада Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки урочисто


ПРОГОЛОШУЄ

НЕЗАЛЕЖНІСТЬ УКРАЇНИ та створення самостійної української держави - УКРАЇНИ.

Територія України є неподільною і недоторканою.

Віднині на території України мають чинність виключно Конституція і закони України.

Цей акт набирає чинності з моменту його схвалення.


ВЕРХОВНА РАДА УКРАЇНИ

“PERVERTS” AND “PUPPETEERS”: HOW THE KREMLIN SHAPES THE NEGATIVE IMAGE OF THE EU IN UKRAINE

HISTORY

Since its independence, Ukraine has made significant progress towards European integration. Since 2022, Ukraine has had the official status of an EU candidate country. This was preceded by the signing of the Association Agreement in 2014 and the visa-free regime in 2017. The Kremlin's efforts are aimed at blocking Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU. The Russians' arsenal includes corruption, blackmail, political and economic pressure, force and information tools.

The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security's study “Kremlin's Anti-European Narratives: A Map of Information Threats to Ukraine”, analyzes Russian interference in the Ukrainian media field.

KREMLIN'S ANTI-EUROPEAN NARRATIVES

The Kremlin seeks to make destructive narratives an organic part of the information field of the attacked states. The narratives are targeted at the Ukrainian audience:

- “Ukraine is a puppet of the West”;
- “European elites benefit from the war in Ukraine”;
- “EU countries claim Ukrainian territories”;
- “Europe is experiencing spiritual decline”;
- “The European Union is doomed to collapse”.

Each of them is aimed at undermining the Ukrainian audience's trust in European values, European countries, the EU, and Europe as a whole. At the same time, Russians are trying to “normalize” and legitimize their own aggression against Ukraine by attributing similar plans or aspirations to European states.



SERHII ZHUKOV, ANALYST OF CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SECURITY

RUSSIAN TACTICS: MEMES, FAKES, MANIPULATIONS

Destructive narratives are promoted in the Ukrainian media field not only by spreading false or manipulative information, but also by changing the lexical and semantic field. The narrative about the “spiritual decline of Europe” is a part of an array of verbal and visual memes that have been promoted since at least the early 2000s. The terms “Gayropa” and ‘Eurosodom’ are part of anti-European rhetoric and the narrative of “spiritual decline.”

The Russians resort to generating newsworthy events that Ukrainian and foreign media cannot ignore. They regularly quote statements by Putin and other top Russian officials who talk about an “LGBT dictatorship” or ‘predict’ the “inevitable collapse of the EU.”

Anti-Jewish narratives are also promoted through the production of fake news and manipulation of information.

One of the most extreme manifestations of the promotion of the narrative of the “spiritual decline of Europe” is the spread of conspiracy theories and fakes about the involvement of European and Ukrainian elites in organizing child sex trafficking from Ukraine to the EU. In 2023-2024, information operations were conducted, with First Lady Olena Zelenska being the main target of attacks.

RUSSIAN TACTICS: ACCESS TO THE UKRAINIAN AUDIENCE

With Russian social media and other information resources blocked, Russian special services are finding other access points to the Ukrainian audience. They use:

They use:

- Pseudo-Ukrainian Telegram channels and other media that mimic Ukrainian ones;
- Russian influence agents who work for the Ukrainian audience and spread destructive narratives;
- TikTok videos with hashtags popular in Ukraine;
- resources targeting residents of the TOT of Ukraine;
- Comments to publications in the Ukrainian segment of social networks and online resources with a Ukrainian audience.

CONCLUSIONS

Russian interference in the Ukrainian media field is aimed at spreading Euroscepticism and forming strong negative prejudices against the EU, European countries, values, and lifestyles in general. Destructive narratives “explain” to the audience that Europe is to blame for Ukraine's problems, including Russian aggression. To influence the information space, both fakes and manipulative coverage of facts and real problems are used, and trends in media consumption are taken into account.

To prevent information threats and minimize the harmful effects of Russian interference, the efforts of the state and non-state actors should be aimed primarily at forming and promoting constructive narratives, as well as reducing the resources that Russia can direct to information warfare.



FULL VERSION VIA
THIS QR CODE

THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE RUSSIAN TROLLEY FACTORY
IN SAINT PETERSBURG.

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

OUR COLUMNISTS:



UKRAINE? 30 YEARS OF WAR THREATENS EUROPE

Early summer has arrived on the Black Sea coast, with sunny days, with lush fields and bright forests, with wounded, but vibrant cities. Ukrainians are tired after 11 years of war with Russia, but also proud that they've stopped Vladimir Putin's fascist superpower, a Russian's defeat in the sense that according to the Kremlin's and many so-called experts' calculations, Moscow's armies should have wiped out its European neighbor within a few weeks of the invasion in February 2022.



A WAR OF CIVILIZATION: NOW IT IS THE US VS EUROPE

Latin America, having for centuries been subjected to the whims of an imperialist and often colonialist United States, observes with a sense of foreboding and déjà vu the treatment that Washington under Donald Trump is metering out to Europe. "You are now experiencing what we experienced for generations. Rest assured it will get worse," warns a Brazilian friend of mine, a writer and translator with expertise in German literature.



IT'S TIME FOR EUROPE TO UNITE: GOODBYE TO THE US

A gentle summer rain washed the dusty streets of Montevideo, Uruguay's capital, as I arrived at the harbor terminal to board the evening ferry for Buenos Aires across the Plata River. Being early, I had a glass of the good Uruguayan red wine, and on my mobile phone began reading the news, the scandalous, the terrible, horrible, awful news, pouring in from Washington.



PER NYHOLM

Per Nyholm has been a Danish journalist since 1960. He is based in Austria and is a columnist and foreign correspondent at the Jyllands-Posten, a liberal Danish daily newspaper.



GAMES WITH UKRAINIAN CHILDREN: HOW PUTIN IS PREPARING A NEW ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION

It all started with a dozen children who were voluntarily enrolled by their pro-Russian parents in the first branch of the Russian “UnArmy” in Mariupol. It was the summer of 2022, the beginning of the occupation, and thus the parents of the children who wore the uniform of Putin’s personal children’s army hoped to get maximum help from the occupation authorities. There was no help, but this was the beginning of the introduction of a policy of militarization of children in the occupied territories. The starting point for the formation of a new format of re-education of Ukrainians into ideological soldiers of the Putin regime.



ANOTHER HIGH PRICE FOR PEACE: LOST ANCESTORS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

This is a very sensitive, taboo, and difficult conversation. It is about us, people from the occupied territories, and about things that do not immediately come to mind. Recently, the occupiers began to “clean up” the graves of World War II heroes in Mariupol. Real and fictional, but we are not talking about them now. Now we are talking about how wildly decorated single graves look now, with fresh flowers and order around them compared to all the others in the cemetery.



1,300 SQUARE KILOMETERS OF TRUTH, OR WHAT PUTIN DID NOT SAY

Recently, Putin gave another solo performance at the pseudo-economic forum in Vladivostok. But essentially, this was the first major public speech by Putin for the Russians since the beginning of our occupation of Kursk. Therefore, it is somewhat special and genuinely interesting to understand compared to the standard blabbering speeches of the tsar. Thus, the speech and discussion can be divided into three blocks.



PETRO ANDRYUSHCHENKO

Petro Andryushchenko was an adviser to the mayor of Mariupol. After the Russian Federation started war in Ukraine in February 2022, he became the de facto “voice” of Mariupol. On his Telegram channel, “Andryushchenko Time”, he tells the truth about the horrors of the occupation.



TEAM

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW



IHOR SOLOVEY
PARTNER



VOLODYMYR SAVCHENKO
CEO OF THE UKRAINIAN
REVIEW



TETIANA STELMAKH
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF



ARTEM KASPARIAN
PROJECT PARTNER



DOVYDAS VITKAUSKAS
SUPREME LAW EXPERT



YEVHEN DZHUMYGA,
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Ukrainian Review is an English-language analytical publication that works in two directions: countering hostile disinformation and analyzing events related to Ukraine or important events in the world. Our goal is to inform foreign readers about the situation in Ukraine, to cover all of Russia's war crimes, and to help Ukraine win the information war.

We also actively cooperate with foreign speakers and provide them with the opportunity to contribute to our columns or participate in writing socially important materials. Our resource presents the opinions of various leading politicians, volunteers, military, public figures and experts in various fields.

The media was created by Volodymyr Savchenko.

The Ukrainian Review is an independent English-language analytical media outlet operating entirely on a volunteer basis. Our project exists thanks to the support of dedicated Ukrainians and generous partners who believe in our mission and contribute resources and funding.

We're planning to expand The Ukrainian Review and publish the journal in multiple languages, including French, Spanish, German, Greek, and Japanese. If you are interested in contributing to the project's development, supporting its distribution, or creating localized editions, we are open to collaboration.



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This magazine has been printed with the financial support of our friends. For security reasons, we do not mention specific names, but we sincerely thank everyone who contributed to its creation, provided financial assistance, and helped with its distribution. We deeply value your support.

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